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Preface 
This elaboration has been inspired by my numerous visits in the Balkans, especially in the 
former Yugoslav states. The year 2006 is assumed to be a crucial year for Kosovo . The final 
status of province is supposed to be established fınally after several years of peace-building 
process supervised by the international community after its military intervention in the 
Kosovo conflict in the spring 1999. In my work I ha ve sought to analyse the role of the 
international community in resolving the Kosovo conflict. My objective was to examine 
involvement of the entire international community as well as its components, and to explain 
changing attitudes, aims and tasks, which were undertaken in order to establish peace and 
stability in the heart of the Western Balkans. 
The author of this thesis likes to acknowledge the efforts of those people who contributed to 
this work. 
Firstly and most for ali I would like to thank Dr. Esra LaGro from Dogus University for her 
supervision as well as for invaluable advises and support. 
My sıncere thanks to Dr. Tom Casier from Maastricht University for his supervısıon, 
assistance and valuable advises . 
1 am gratefu l to Miss Volga Kurbanzade Caglayangil from Dogus University for all her effort 
and advises provided, especially with re gard to the theoretical part of this elaboration. 
Moreover, a special thank to Mr. Marek Antoni Nowicki, the International Ombudsperdon in 
Kosovo in 2000-2005, for providing me with publications and information, especially those 
on human rights in Kosovo . 
Finally, special thanks to Isak Gllogovci, Pristine-bom cLment Secretary General of Young 
European Federalist, whom I interviewed on the Kosovo issue, and who was the fırst to teli 
me 'the Kosovo story' a few years ago. 
T omasz Zomaczuk 
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Summary 
The intemational community plays an essential role in resolving conflict in Kosovo. Military 
intervention in the conflict was undertaken by the intemational community in the spring 1999 
as a response on violence and ethnic cleanings conducted by the Serbian forces in the 
province. A peace agreement has been signed after dozen weeks of air operation. From this 
time onwards the intemational community have been responsible for the peace-building 
process in Kosovo. Recently the most essential issue is the question of the final status of the 
province. This is supposed to be achieved under the supervision of the intemational 
community in order to establish peace and security in this former Yugoslav province. 
In this study I aim to examine and analyse involvement of the entire intemational community 
as well as its components in the Kosovo conflict. In my elaboration I explain changing 
attitudes, objectives and tasks, which were undertaken by intemational actors in the course of 
the conflict. 
In order to understand better the contemporary conflict in Kosovo I start with explanation of 
deep roots of the conflict. I provide with the overview of history of the Serbo-Albanian 
relations in the province and altemate it with different factors that contributed to the conflict. 
In the next chapter, I present theoretical approach to the conflict management and the third 
party intervention. Furthermore, I illustrate the role of the intemational community in the 
conflict resolution process. 
Subsequently, I provide with case study on intervention of the intemational community in the 
Kosovo conflict. Moreover, I present negotiations on ending the war and present the aims of 
the international community in the peace-building process. 
ln the !ast chapter, I explain the role of the intemational community in post-war Kosovo. With 
regard to this I examine the peace-building operation under the intemational supervision. I 
conclude with discussion on the issue of the final status of Kosovo and the attitude of the 
international cornmunity towards this question. 
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Introduction 
The task before the international community 
is to lıelp the people in Kosovo to rebuild 
their lives and heal the woıınds of conflict. 
UN Secretary-General Kofı Annan 
Armed conflicts between nations and states have been always shaping the order in the world. In 
Europe dealing with the diversity of nations, military conflicts play sufficient role in history of 
the continent. We can easily notice that phenomenon starting from the great battles in ancient 
Greece and the Roman Empire, through numerous wars in the Middle Ages on the continent, not 
to mention about Crusades, followed by never-ending wars in the seventeenth century and the 
Napoleon Era afterwards, concluding with the greatest failure of humanity during the First and 
the Second World War in the bloody twentieth century. 
Although immediately after the World War Two the world leaders stressed that we never want to 
experience such events again, lots of military corıflicts maintained and new rose. At the same 
time a number of intemational and regional organisations to prevent and intervene in the military 
conflicts were established. However, conflicts have been sti li creating the history of Europe till 
the end of the twentieth century and did not disappear at the beginning of the third millennium. In 
the nowadays world we stili deal with a number of military conflicts and try to resolve them in a 
peaceful way. 
Nevertheless, the year 1999 certainly will not be written down with pride in the books of the 
history of Europe. War in Kosovo 1 and military intervention that happened in March 1999 was 
undoubtedl y the deterrnining strategic event of the past years. The war was considered as a result 
of struggle between Albanians and Serbs at this teıTitory and ethnic cleanings conducted by the 
Serbian police on the Kosovar Albanians. Although many people had predicted the war, nobody 
had been able to prevent it from breaking out. Despite the fact , that a nunıber of intemational 
1 Although the ternı Kosovo is used foıınally world wide. tlıe full name oftlıe tenitory is Kosorn and /\Iero/ıija. Tlıe 
Albaııiaıı name far tlıe provı nce is Kosorn and the Serbiaıı name is Koso ı:o. 
organisations and regional NGOs were involved in the conflict in order to prevent war, in the 
spring 1999 the US and its NATO allies launched air strikes against the Form er Republic of 
Yugoslavia. A peace agreement that had been signed after 78 days of war constituted a basis for 
long and complicated process of peace-building. The problem of what to do with Kosovo remains 
the top issue of the !ast years for the European Union. Until now the final status of Kosovo is 
uncertain. However, it constitutes essential question to be solved as soon as possible in order to 
sustain peace and security in the Balkans and within entire Europe. 
The objective of this elaboration is to examıne and analyse the role of the intemational 
community in the Kosovo Conflict. With regard to that I illustrate the attitude towards the 
Kosovo question of the entire intemational community as well as of its components . Moreover, 
the objectives and task of the international community throughout the conflict are presented. 
Furthermore, I argue on why the perception of the conflict has been changing in the course of 
time. Apart from that , I present what international actors are the main decision makers and how 
and why it is changing. What is more, I try to prove that the issue of the final status for Kosovo is 
essential for the entire international community and in particular for the European Union and that 
its role in resolving the conflict in the province should increase . 
In my research I used academic literature from world wide. lt enabled to me to confront opinions 
of both Albanian and Serbian scholars as well as viewpoints of scholars from Europe, from the 
United States, and from elsewhere. It refers in particular to the fırst chapter as in different 
literature different factors are emphasised and it needs deep analysis in order to avoid bias . 
Furthermore, I supported my study by using numerous reports of international organisations and 
research institutes . What is more, I utilized position papers of international organisations and also 
original documents. By doing so, I tried to consider numerous viewpoints and different 
arguments and confront them among themselves as well as with my own opinion. 
I start my discussion with multidimensional analysis of the orıgıns of the conflict, which I 
provide with in the fırst chapter. In this paı1 of the elaboration I alternate the history of Serbo-
Albanian relations in Kosovo with different variables and factors that contributed to the conflict. 
Deep roots of the conflict remain of great importance in the contemporary conflict in the province 
and understanding them ma y facilitate resolution of the conflict. 
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In the second chapter, I provide with the theoretical framework for the conflict management and 
the third party intervention. In respect of this I present firstly the characteristics of both conflict 
and intervention. Secondly, a discussion on when and how to intervene have been provided. 
Finally, I present the role of the intemational community in the conflict resolution. Theoretical 
framework is essential for the study as the theory constitutes a starting point to the action and the 
point of reference to the practice. 
In the third chapter, I propose case study on intervention of the intemational community in the 
Kosovo conflict. Firstly, I discuss the phenomenon ofa state sovereignty and confront it with the 
limits of intervention. Secondly, process of the intemationalisation of the conflict has been 
analysed. Subsequently, I raise the question of why the military intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict took place and how it was conducted. I conclude with negotiations on ending the war and 
I present the objectives for the intemational community in the peace-building process. 
In my final chapter, I illustrate the role of the intemational community in post-war Kosovo. 
Throughout the chapter I present what is role of the en tire intemational community as well as its 
components in the security-building process, in democracy building, and in reconstruction of 
economic and social system. In the second part of the fourth chapter I raise the question of the 
fina l status of Kosovo and anal yse the attitude of the intemational community towards this 
tremendously important issue. 
I conclude wi th the discussion on multidimensional changes that took place in the course of the 
conflict in Kosovo . With respect to that, I refer to altemations and shifts in involvement of the 
intemational community to the conflict. Finally, I illustrate factors that should be taken under 
consideration by the intemational community when deciding on the final status of the province 
and I present multidimensional consequences of such a decisi on. 
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1. Analysing the origins of the Kosovo conflict 
1.1 Introduction 
The shortest phrase describing the Kosovo conflict expresses that 'the abolition of Kosovo's 
autonomous status by President Milosevic in 1989 resulted in the conflict with the Albanians 
which a decade later was to end in war' (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.3). The campaign for a 
Greater Serbia launched by Milosevic at the end of the nineteen eighties tumed quickl y into a 
drama ofa Smaller Serbia ten years la ter. 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate and analyse the oıigins of the Kosovo conflict. I will 
attempt to look at the conflict from different perspectives and to consider different factors , which 
contributed to that. A wide range of the li terature used as references in the chapter represents both 
Albanian and Serbian scholars as well as those from across Europe and United States. Revealing 
viewpoints from different perspectives and academic backgrounds contributes to the diversity of 
the paper. By doing so, I tried to respect numerous interpretations of the issue and avoid bias in 
the research. 
In this chapter, instead of presenting a pure history of the Serbo-Albanian relations in Kosovo, I 
altemate it with diverse variables that had their input to the conflict. Presenting more factors that 
affected the conflict in the province makes the subj ect easier to understand for the reader. Firstly, 
I try to find answer the question of the native inhabitants of the region. This constitutes an 
attempt to exatnine who invaded whom. Secondly, I present the contribution of Albanians and 
Serbs to the development of Kosovo during the medieval period when the province belonged to 
the Great Serbian state. Moreover, the role of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in the Serbo-Albanian 
conflict is illustrated. I try to answer why this single battle became one of great importance to the 
conflict. Subsequently, 1 analyse the relation of the nations under the Ottoman presence in the 
Balkans. As the violence between both nations increased in that period, 1 try to find out who was 
taking revenge on whom. 
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Furthermore, I present the history of both nations within the multinational Yugoslav state, trying 
to examine the rights of both the Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo. What is more, 1 refer in this 
chapter to the contribution of the economical situation in the province to the conflict. Yet, the 
usage of the myth of the Battle of Kosovo Polje has been analysed. Besides, the course of the 
Kosovo conflict in the !ast decade of the twentieth century has been examined. Apart from this, I 
touch upon the role of nationalism and ethnicity in the conflict, putting it into the theoretical 
framework. Finally, before concluding, 1 try to answer the question if there is any historical and 
present truth that would be acceptable by both of the nations within the territory of Kosovo, and 
which would result in fınding a golden mean for the future of the province. 
1.2 Who invaded whom? Th e deep roots of the conjlict 
Confrontation between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is not a new phenomenon as such. 
Although one of the well known Serbian scholars, Dusan Batakovic, states in the very fırst 
sentence of his essay Kosovo and Metohia - a Clash of Civilisations that ' Kosovo (and Metohia) 
is the native and ancestral land of the Serbs ' (Batakovic, 1992) , the question seems to be much 
more complicated. Both nations have been struggling in this area for the hundreds of years . 
Illyrians are considered as the earliest known inhab itan ts of Kosovo and the Albanians claim 
today to be direct descendants of them (Jansen, 1999). Neveı1he less, it is has not been proved if 
there is an unambiguo us connection between Illyrians and the Albanians. Neither the origins of 
the Albanian language constitute the answer (Nowak, 1999, p.3 ). Serbian scholars maintain, by 
tum, that Albanians appeared on the scene in the early Middle Ages as a result of intermarriage 
between nomadic shepherds and unromanized remnants of Illyrians and Dardanians from Thrace. 
Therefore there is discrepancy when determining which nation was the first one to be settled in 
Kosovo (Jansen, 1999). 
However, there is a common agreement that Slavs crossed Danube and moved to the Balkans 
before the end of the 6th century (Jansen, 1999; Mannic , 1990) . Jansen presenting a viewpoint of 
Serbian scholars states that following trends of migration in the region, Ill yrian speaking people , 
known to thei r neighbours as the Albanians , moved eastward from the Adriatic into the Kosovo 
area of the Balkans. NoıTis presents different approach from the Serbian scholars . By quoting 
s 
Ala in Ducellier, a leading Western scholar on the Albanian history, he emphasizes that 'In 
Kosovo , it is evidently the Slavs, or the Slavized people, Bulgarians then Serbs, who occupied, 
from the seventh century, a region the population of which was solidly Illyro-Albanian since 
Antiquity ' (Nonis, 1996, p .10). Asa comment to that he claims that by the process of inevitable 
Salivation of the native population, Kosovo become the principal political and economic centre 
of the Serbian state, but not earlier then in the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, he maintains 
unable to define what as the proportion of both na ti ons in the region at that time. 
Kosovo became a part of the Serbian medieval state after numerous churches and monasteries 
were built and bishoprics established in the region. As a result, by the twelfth century almost ali 
arable land in the region now known as Kosovo was in Slavic hands. Since the second half of the 
twelfth century, when the Kingdom of Serbia was created, Kosovo maintained within its borders 
(Jansen, 1999; Leurdijk & Zende, 200 1, p.4-5 ; Mannic, 1990). 
Noel Malcolm, a professional Westem scho lar on the Kosovo issue, claims nevertheless , that 
neither the capital of the Kingdom of Serbia nor the first Serb ian monasteries were placed in 
Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998, p.8). Such a view is widely criticized by Serbian scholars. They 
emphasize that Prizren, on of the main cit ies in the present Kosovo, became the first capital of the 
Serbian medieval empire . Different than Malcolm view presents also Miranda Vickers who 
maintains that Kosovo become both cultural and administrative centre of Kosovo after the fail of 
Constantinople in 1204 (Vickers, 1998, pp.7-8). 
Although Serbs had come to Kosovo relatively late, in the seventh century, they contributed more 
than any other nation to the development of civi li sation in the region. This is proved by all the 
geographical names that are in Serbian, though nowadays they have equivalents in A lbanian. 
Fuıihermore, this terri tory played in Middle Ages a key role, thanks to its prosperity, and become 
the cradle of the Serbian statehood and a significant centre of the Christian culture. In the twelfth 
century Kosovo had became an integrated part of Serbia and two centuries later constituted a 
central paıi of the country, full of cities and villages with more than 1300 churches and 
monasteries built up all over this region . From this moment, without doubts, the so il of Kosovo is 
considered by Serbs as the cradl e of their na ti on and thi s seems to be hard to question. 
1.3 How did a single battle becorne the legend? The role of the Battle of Kosovo Polje 
Searching for the retuming point in the history of Kosovo, many historians refer to the Battle of 
Kosovo Polje in 1389. It is believed, that the Turkish-Ottoman army supposedly had defeated the 
Serbian army and stayed in the Balkans for centuries taking native inhabitants under occupation. 
This medieval battle is often considered as the origin of the twentieth century' s armed conflict in 
Kosovo. From the Serbian-nationalist point of view the Battle of Kosovo Polje was the beginning 
of the long and dark period of repression of Serbian people by ' the Turks' and not before the 
earl y twentieth century Kosovo , the 'cradle of Serbia' and the centre of the medieval Serbian 
Kingdom, was brought back to the Serbian state after being recaptured by the Serbian-
Montenegrin army (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p .3 -4) . 
Whether Kosovo had constituted the core of medieval Serbia or not, the myth of the Battle of 
Kosovo Polje in combination with the Balkans' nationalism had great input on events in the 
future. Serb ian Prince Lazar who had been killed during the battle, was seen afterwards by 
orthodox Christian Serbs as the Serbian J es us Christ and Kosovo become ' the new J erusalem' 
(Vickers, 1998, p. 15). Moreover, the oath of Prince Lazar, that it is better to obtain freedom in the 
celestial empire of Jesus Christ than to !ive humiliated under the oppression of the earthly 
kingdom, is indeed derived from the New Testament tradition of martyrdom. During the long 
centuries of Turkish rule, it became the key thought to Serbian national ideology. Furthermore, 
Prince Lazar, sacrifıced his life for faith and liberty, was canonized as a saint and the date of the 
battle became one of the central feast days , the day of the Kosovo martyrs (Sotiropoulou, 2002, 
s.6). For Serbs it was not only the defeat of the nation, but also the defeat of the Christianity and 
the Serbian Orthodox Church. On the whole, in Serbian-nationalists' eyes the Muslim population 
of the Kosovar Albanians, associated with ' the Turks', was treated as almost personally 
responsible for the Battle of Kosovo Polje and the subsequent domination of Ottomans. 
Ali things considered, the defeat of Serbs in the Battle of Kosovo Polje had weakened the 
medieval Serbia what sixty years afterwards , in 1459, resulted in loss of independence in favour 
of Turkey for almost fıve centuries . This event, that for Serbs undoubtedl y had been considered 
as the end ofa certain epoch, for Albanians meant the beginning and the biıih of their national 
identity. As a result of the defeat that Serbs had suffered on Kosovo Polje, the ethnic structure of 
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Kosovo started to alter in favour of Albanians. This was caused by fact that precisely here, in the 
heart of the Serbian matrix, Turks settled the obedient Albanians who convert to the religion of 
the Prophet Muhammad. Not before this moment of history have the Albanians lied claim to 
Kosovo. 
After the Battle of Kosovo Polje, for the average Serb the word Kosovo meant the Holy Land, 
covered with numerous churches and monasteries scattered all over this area that is to be regained 
some day. lt became the 'Serbian Jerusalem', from which the Serbs have been systematically 
expelled and persistently persecuted in the course of the !ast few centuries until the present day. 
Hundreds of years after the Battle, its myth had grown to dignity of national trauma that was used 
in shaping policies in the Westem Balkans. 
1.4 Who is taking revenge on whom ? Serbo-Albanian relations ıınder the Ottoman rule 
After losing of independence by the Serbian state, situation in Kosovo changed dramaticall y. 
Changes in the ethnic structure were followed by fact, that Kosovo became a land with sacred 
places al so for Albanians. Good examples of that is the Imperial Mosque erected by Mehmed II 
the Conqueror in 146 1 as well as the Great Mosque in Prizren from 1615, funded by Pasha Sinin. 
The latter one is also known fo r a fact that , as a revenge for the Serbian national upraise, he had 
plundered the Mileseva Monastery on the Good Friday in 1594 and robbed the relics of the Saint 
Sava, the first Serbian patriarch, buming them afterwards (Ryszkowski , 2006, p.89). 
Before Serbia had been annexed to the Ottoman Empire, Albanians who during the fıfteenth 
century in the great majority were stil! Christians lived together in reasonable harmony with 
Serbs. Soon afterwards, they started to move back into Kosovo in considerable numbers and the 
Ottomans took sovereignty over the region in 1489. Subsequently, Albanians gradually became 
converted to Is lam (Jansen, 1999). In the late seventeenth century a large numbers Serbs left 
Kosovo as a result of military victories of the Ottoman Turks after the failed Serbian national 
upraise in 1689-90 (Nowak, 1999, p.9 ). The displacement of the Serbian population, known in 
history as ' the great migration ' caused that the core paıi of the nation moved northward to the 
regıon of Belgrade. Therefore the territory of Kosovo became underpopulated . Albanians, by 
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tum, attracted by available fertile land, resettled the region moving eastward from the hills of 
Albania. At this time these Albanians were both Christian and Muslim (Jansen, 1999). 
In 1830, as a satellite of the govemment of the Ottoman Empire, an autonomous Serbian 
Principality was established. As a result of the Russo-Ottoman Wars four decades later, in the 
Balkans raised the nationalist movements and, unlike elsewhere, religious division between 
orthodox Christian and Muslims played an important role in this phenomenon. After decline of 
the Ottoman Empire, ali of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece rose again as nation-states of the 
Orthodox Christianity. During the First Balkan War that broke out in 1912, the new Balkans ' 
independent countries pushed Ottomans back to Bosphorus . Serbian-Montenegrin army invaded 
Kosovo inhabited largely by Albanians. However, the Albanian population was pushed 
westwards to the mountains . As a result of Albanian nationalism, a new state of Albania was 
established, with a domination of the Muslim population. Kosovo, where at that time Albanians 
constituted the great majority of inhabitants, remained within the borders of Serbia after signing 
intemational protocols. Albania was dissatisfied complaining that more than half of Albanian 
population stayed outside the borders of the new state of Albania. According to Leurdijk and 
Zende, these facts illustrate the real origins of the Kosovo question (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001 , p.8-
11 and 171 ). From the Serbian perspective nevertheless, this fact constituted liberalisation of the 
Serbs living in the province from the Turk occupation (Nowak, 1999, p .13) . 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire constituted another tuming point ın the history of the 
Balkans and in the relations between Albanians and Serbs. William Hagen from Univers ity of 
Califomia notices that 'Balkan ethnic strains are neither as ancient as time nor as recent as the 
rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic ; rather, they are about as old as the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire.' According to him, today's tensi ons are the result of the region's absorption into 
the empire, which led to the extraordinary dispersion and inter-mixture of ethnic groups in 
Balkan (Hagen, 1999). Indeed, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire opened opportunities for 
the nations of the Balkans to formulate an independent nation-state. Increase nationalistic attitude 
that was needed at that time played undoubtedly a key role in this process. 
1.5 Kosovo or Kosova? Multinationalism within the Yugoslav state 
During the First World War fighting broke out between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and in 
regard with the course of the war, the Serbian army had to leave the region. Nevertheless, 
immediatel y after the end of the war, the Serbian units returned to Kosovo and took revenge on 
the Kosovar Albanians for their actions against the Serbs during the war. Kosovo stayed in 
Serbian hands in boundaries of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Shortly the 
name was turned into Yugoslavia where Serbs dominated. During the period of Interbellum the 
number of Albanians living in Kosovo constituted almost two third of the entire number of 
inhabitants in the region, and of these three-quarters were Muslim. Although the colonisation 
actions were undertaken by Serbs, till the Second World War the proportion did not change 
dramaticall y (Jansen, 1999; Leurdijk & Zende, 2001 , pp. 12-1 4 and 171-1 72) . 
In the time of the Second World War, the great part of Kosovo was added to Albania and both 
were occupi ed by Italy. Two of much small er parts were under protection of Germans and 
Bulgarians. However, this occupation was considered by Albanians as liberalisation from the 
Serb ian hands (Nowak, 1999, p.15) . Collaborating Albanians take revenge on Serbian 
inhabitants. After the capitulation of Italy in 1943, Germany took over the control over the 
region. Yugos lav partisans liberated Kosovo a year afterwards. Subsequently the Communist 
Party of Y ugoslavia recognized Kosovo as a part of Serb ia. In 1945 Marsha ll T ito proclaimed the 
Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia (FR Y), consisted of six republics : Slovenia, Croatia , Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. A year afterwards the new constitution of the 
republic assigns Kosovo the status of' autonomous region'. 
Despi te fact that the abilities for Albanian education and press in comparison with Interbellum 
period increased from the end of the Second World War onwards, discrimination and repression 
remained . The number of Albanians in Kosovo was increas ing gradually through the years of the 
Cold War. In 1969 the Serbian Parliament approves a new constitution for Kosovo assigning, 
among others, its own Supreme Court and independent Uni versity of Pristine2. A few years later, 
in 1974, accordi ng to the new constitution of the FRY, Koso vo was given the status of 
2 Ali tlıe n a ııı es oft lı e citi es an villages in Kosoı·o are d i s tin gui s lı ed into Albanian and Serbian naııı es. Pri stin e is 
Prislııinii in Albani an aııd Pıi stina in Serbiaıı. 
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autonomous province with almost the same rights as the official republics enjoyed (Leurdijk & 
Zende, 2001, pp .12-14 and 171-173). 
In 1980 Josip Bros Tito died. He was the great leader of the multinational Yugoslav state. This 
event is considered as the end ofa certain epoch in the history ofYugoslavia. It meant namely the 
beginning of the end of the multinational Westem Balkan state. A simple reason for that was fact 
that there was no leader that with such charisma would keep the nations together within the 
unnatural state where differences in inter-ethnic relations were skilfully hidden (Klemencic, 
1989, p .230). Meanwhile, the number of Albanian population in within Kosovo borders increased 
from 67 percent at the very beginning of 1960s to 77 percent at the very beginning of 1980s 
(SOK, 2003). Nevertheless, it was not granted the right to separate from the federation and never 
received a status ofa Republic. 
1.6 How did the economic situation contribute to the conjlict? 
Apart from ali ethnic, cultural, religious and historical differences, there was a clear economic 
deviation regarding Kosovo . Both the working and the li ving conditions were much weaker in 
comparison with Serbia and the entire Yugoslav state. Disappointment of such a situation in 
province took Albanians to the street (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p . 173 ). First riots broke out in 
the capita l of the region in March 1981 . Students were complaining about poor conditions at the 
University of Pristine, the third biggest university in Yugoslavia at that time. Workers of loca! 
factories had joined students before demonstrations declined. The demands were soon broadened 
into climes that Kosovo should become an independent Yugoslav republic or be unified with 
Albania (Joffe, 1996, p.92). Following that, the Yugoslav National Arrny was called to intervene. 
Legal rights were weakened as Albanian officials hesitated to charge Albanians for what had 
been seen by Serbs as ethnic crimes. Thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins began to leave 
Kosovo. As a result of Serbian emigration from Kosovo, economic hardship within Serbia 
deepened . To deci ine and finally halt immigration , the Serb ian League of Communists (LCY) of 
Yugoslavia implemented a series of explicit discrimination measures favouring Serbs who stayed 
in Kosovo. Anıong others, it provided automatic admission of Serb students to Pristine 
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University, regardless of their qualifications. Moreover, it prohibited the sale of land and 
buildings by Serbs and Montenegrins to Albanians. Furtherrnore, it promised jobs, housing, and 
schooling for Serbs and Montenegrins retuming to Kosovo , and it built factories for Serb workers 
(Crawford, 1998, p.239). 
In the first half of 1980s, unemployment in Serbia was about 18 percent, whereas in Kosovo it 
reached o ver 50 percent. By 1985 already one million people were unemployed in Serbia 
(Crawford, 1998, p.229-230). Although Kosovo was potentially one of the richest regions in 
foımer Yugoslavia , with 50 percent of the coal deposits and 60 percent of the lead and zinc 
deposits, economically it was far behind the rest of the country. Average incomes constituted 
only a third part of the national level. Not to mention that at the end of 1980s only 11 .5 percent of 
the population was regularly employed, comparing to 26 percent elsewhere in Yugoslavia. 
Although Kosovo contained 8 percent of the Yugoslavian population, its contribution to the 
Yugoslavian Social Product in 1989 was as less as 2 percent (Joffe, 1996, p.94). 
Due to the disastrous economical conditions in Kosovo, the Serbs in a great number were sell ing 
their property to the Albanians and trying to find refuge in Serbia proper. Those who stayed were 
spontaneously organizing their self-defence gro ups. The Albanian explained that the Kosovar 
Serbs were leaving the province due to economic factors only and that the Kosovar Albanians 
were emigrating for the same economic reasons. The Serbian explanation was that there are some 
economic factors for the migrations but most of the migrations of Serbs were moti vated by non-
economic reasons . Regardless of the reasons, thousands of Serbs were going to Belgrade, in hope 
to present there their grievances and to ask for help and protection. Moreover, it resulted in an 
increase of 'ethnic homogenization' for those Serbs who stayed in Kosovo and were confronting 
themselves with the Kosovar Albanians afterwards (Savich, 2000). 
1.7 Th e ıısage ofthe myth 
The Battle of Kosovo Polje and the Kosovo itse lf was given a status of the event and the place 
that define th e Serbian nation. The myths of the pas t cultivated by the Serbs through centuries of 
Ottoman nıle became paı1 of the Serbian memory during the nineteenth century and were being 
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transformed by the Serbian elites into ideologies for the fulfılment of their political agendas . 
Following Sotiropoulou we can state that history can be a weapon and tradition can fuel ethnic 
conflict (Sotiropoulou, 2002, s.7). 
Although the myth of Kosovo Polje had been always of the great importance for Serbs and plays 
the same role for this nation as Thermopylae for Greeks, not before 1989 a clear political use of 
the myth had been done. By the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the battle, on 28 June 1989, 
Milosevic clearly used history in his public address. 'The moment has come when, staying on the 
fields of Kosovo, we can say openly and clearly - no longer! Today, six centuries later, we are 
again fighting battles, they are not armed battles although such a things cannot be yet excluded ', 
he sa id. 
This influential speech by Milosevic was preceded by voting of the Kosovar Parliament in favour 
of reducing Kosovo's autonomy on 23 March 1989 that happened both under pressure from 
Serbian army and by fraudulent counts . A year later the Kosovar Parliament voted almost 
unanimously for the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo that was suppose to independent 
from Serbia but within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In practice nevertheless, the Kosovar 
Parliament and Government had been dissolved and the Kosovo adminish·at ion came into Serbian 
hands (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001 , pp.8 and 174). A decade after the speech of Milosevic, the 
famous phrase that 'armed battles ( ... ) cannot be yet excluded' came tnıe and the war in Kosovo 
became a fac t. 
Fo llowing Vamik Volkan we can say that the Battle of Kosovo Polj e constitutes a 'chosen 
trauma ' for the Serbian nation. He considers such a phenomenon as a factor that begins and 
explains collective violence which in Serbian case resulted in hatred to the Albanians and 
subsequently ethnic cleanings of the Muslims (Volkan, 2004 ). Indeed, the myth of Kosovo Polje, 
cultivated by centuries, re-emerged and increased to the great importance in Serbia in the 1980s 
asa powerful mobilizing tool , often juxtaposed with the supposed 'genocide' of ?erbs at the hands 
of Albanians in the autonomous province. After years , the myth was used to commit the genocide 
by the first nati on on the latter one and subsequently to repress and terminate each other within 
the province. 
13 
1.8 With the enemy within one state. From independence of Serbia ta military intervention 
The conflict between both nations increased already in 1970s and 80s. After seri es of repressions 
and imprisonments by Serbs, the Kosovar Albanians abandoned leaming of the Serbian language 
and isolated themselves from the Yugoslav state. The Serbian nationalism reached its climax 
after Milosevic had become the President of the Serbian League of Communists at the end of 
1987. Asa result of such a situation, followed by deprivation of autonomy of the province, during 
an underground referendum on the independence of Kosovo in September 1991 , an impressive 
number 99.87 percent of the Kosovars voted for independence. The declaration of independence 
was recognized by Albania only. Therefore the province did not spl it up from the federation after 
the dissolving of the Yugoslavian state in the beginning of nineties (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001 , 
pp.18-19 and 174). 
This actually consti tuted the !ast stage ofa process that was called afterwards as 'balkanisation '. 
The tem1 was created to stress circumstances under which the Federal Yugoslav Republic 
dissol ved. The process contained on secession on component republics seceded one by one from 
the federal republic by dec laring independence. It started in !ate June 1991 and took less than a 
year. This caused a range of fights which were difficult to halt because of ethnic consistence of 
the republics. This, by tum, res ulted in war in Bosnia in 1995. It seems that the process of 
balkanisation has stili its continuation. In May 2006, after 3-year moratorium on referendum on 
independence, Montenegrins voted for establishing their own state. It maintains to be seen, if it 
was the !ast na ti on that created a new country on the ruins of forrner Yugoslavia. 
After dissolution of the multi-republican Yugoslav state, Serbia wi th Montenegro was part of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo maintained within Serbian borders. In May 1992, 
after underground elections in the province, Ibrahim Rugova from the Democratic League of 
Kosovo became President obtaining 99.55 percent of votes. On the one hand, Albanians were 
boycotting ali the state system, from education to hospitals. On the other hand repressions from 
the Serbian side continued. In 1994 not less than 60 thousands military and police stationed in 
Kosovo. Rugova became to be a well known and welcomed politician world wide. Nevertheless, 
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he received no offıcial support for independence. lntemational community saw this conflict as 
one to be solved within on the !ine of Pristine-Belgrade (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.21 ). 
Meanwhile, in 1993 , although with longer tradition, the Kosovo Liberation Army appeared on the 
scene. The organisation had been seen by the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo as liberator, whereas 
for Serbs it maintained as a tenorist and occupying force. Savich strongly stresses that the KLA 
was in fact a proxy army for the United States, armed, trained, and supplied by the American 
govemment. He climes moreover that because of propaganda suppoı1, Washington controlled the 
media information about situation in Kosovo (Savich, 2000). In the course of time, the number of 
the KLA activists had been increasing and so were repressions and attacks on Serbian people. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement from November 1995 on peace in the Balkans was another 
disappointment for the Kosovar Albanians. Whereas it gave as equal rights for Bosnian Muslims 
as for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina by establishment of separate national republics within 
the state, it did not touch upon the matter of Kosovo. As a result, it made Milosevic chief 
negotiator for the Kosovo crisis, enjoying almost unconditional Westem support (Batakovic, 
1999). In 1996, KLA for the first time claimed a ride on Serbian Targets. it announced that the 
organisation would fight for the liberation of Kosovo till total victory. in November 1997 the 
KLA fighters proclaimed the Drenica area 'Liberated Tenitory of Drenica'. Although the Serbian 
police was denied access the teITitory, it was the fırst time when Milosevic recogni zed serious 
danger of the Kosovar Albanians' organisation and was threa tened with total loss of Kosovo. As 
a result of that , the Serbian leader decided to the strategy that by many scholars has been seen as 
the most impoı1ant fac tor that caused the coming war. In February 1998 the Serbian 
parliamentary Police s taıied ethnic cleanings operation in the Drenica valley. Dozens of KLA 
fighters , including women and ehil dren, ha ve been killed (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.22). 
This event caused numerous acts of violence from both sides of the conflict. Meanwhile, in the 
second underground elections in Kosovo, lbrahim Rugova was elected president in March 1998 
with the majority 99.2 percent of votes . The talks between Milosevic and Rugova in order to halt 
such a situation in Kosovo started in mid-Ma y. This happened nevertheless under the pressure of 
Westem powers. The talks did not result in any agreernent as the Albanian demands for 
independence were not paralle l to Belgrade's view on the Kosovo issue (Rothschild and 
Wingfield, 2000, p.30 1). Vio lence rnai ntained continued in the province as revenge fo r numero us 
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murders from each side. After another round of ethnic cleanings, in early 1999, the low-level 
conflict tumed out into another full-scene Balkan war. Within few months the earlier predicted 
intemational intervention and NATO air strikes become a fact. The Kosovo war had stared. 
1.9 The role ofnationalism and ethnicity in the conjlict 
It maintains absolutely clear that nationalism has been always playing an important role in the 
mentality of the nations of the Balkans. It played a key role for the nations to distinguish 
themselves from each other in the multinational Yugoslav state. Those two factors have also an 
immense input on conflicts that break out between the nations. 
To understand better what those two phenomena play in conflict, it is worth to use the theoretical 
point of view for both the nationalism and the ethnicity. Emest Gellner, a one of the most 
important scholars of nationalism, bases his definition of nationalism on a shared, standardised, 
high culture (Gellner, 1994, p .7). In Anderson 's approach, nationalism has to be understood also 
with the large cultural system, including language and religion . Talking about cultural roots of 
nationalism he considers two cultural systems as relevant - the religious community based on 
common and ordered beliefs on the past and on the future as well as the dynastic realm that 
appears for the most men as the only imaginable 'political' system (Anderson, 1983 , p.9-22). In 
case of Albanians and Serbs ties within the nation maintains strong as there is an unambi guo us 
difference in creed as the first are Muslims and the latter profess Christianity. Yet, beliefs on the 
past and therefore also on the future of the region of Kosovo are entirely different. Thus, conflict 
in perceiving the same piece of the land in combination with distinguished creeds tums into 
conflict between nations. 
Peter Sugar presents different aspect of nationalism when writing about East European 
nationalism. He defines the phenomenon as the ideology that justifies the beliefs and actions of 
any given nation (Sugar, 1997, p.15). Therefore Albanians couldjustify the revenge on Serbs for 
no respect for their rights in medieval Serbia and, on the other hand, Serbs could justify the 
revenge on Albanians for the Battle on Kosovo Polje and subsequent repressions during the 
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Ottoman period. Following that, this ideology explains the Albanian revenge on Serbs for 
discrimination in the Yugoslavian state and consequently it creates a vicious circle of the conflict. 
The phenomenon of destiny of nations, immemorial past and limitless future seem to appear 
always while creating the nation-state. Those factors are used to legitimize novelty of the state as 
well as historical heritage of a nation . With Anderson we can assume that if nation-states are 
widely concemed to be 'new' and 'historical', the nations to which they give political expression 
always loom out of an immemorial past, and, stili more important, glide into a limitless future 
(Anderson, 1983, p.11-12) . In addition to that, the need for nation-state can be supported by 
argument that the state is seen to provide framework for the nations . Subsequently the state 
provides the forum within which the nation by its national identity can be articulated, represented 
and legitimated (Vincent, 2002, p.38-39). There is no surprise therefore, that Albanians would 
fınd themselves to be direct descendants of Illyrians, fırst known inhabitants of Kosovo in order 
to establi sh a nation-state . Thus, the new state of Kosovo would be fulfılled by history and the 
heritage of the Albanian nation . It would also preserve a national identity of them, which has 
been always threatened within the Serbian state. Moreover, this endeavour would be legitimized 
by poets, like Kosovo-bom Adem Istrefı , or writers, like Adem Demaci , who as a founder of the 
'Revolutionary Movement for Unifıcation with Albania ' was arrested in 1958 and stayed in 
prison for 28 years. 
Another factor to be examined is the ethnicity. Following Sotiropoulou, ethnicity is the state of 
being ethnic or belonging to a certain ethnic group that, by tum, is defined as 'a group of people 
who are generally recognized by themselves and/or the others as a distinct group, with such 
recognition based on social or cultural characteristics' (Sotiropoulou, 2002, s.2). Cultural 
incompatibility therefore results in the ethnic conflict as it takes place between Albanians and 
Serbs. In such a conflict, at least one of the groups define its goals in ethnic terms, namely ela im 
that its distinct ethnic identity and the lack of the opportunity to preserve, express and develop it, 
is the reason that its members do not have the same rights , and cannot realize their interests 
(Sotiropoulou , 2002, s.2-3). That is what Serbs would complain about during the Ottoman period 
when Albanians enjoyed its minority rights and what the Albanians would accuse the Serbs of in 
J 980s and 90s. 
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With the case of Kosovo we can refer to Smith's theory of symbolic attachment with a given 
territory. For Serbs the land was the cradle of their culture and nation to the extent that they 
considered that as their Jerusalem. By doing so, they were emphasizing their rights on a territory 
that was threatened by the existence of another ethnic group, that of Albanians. The latter, on the 
other hand, had also developed strong symbolic attachments with the land by claimed historical 
rights derived from the ancient Illyrians. Consequently, in Kosovo, the emotional attachment to 
the land of the two ethnic groups excluded one another (Sotiropoulou, 2002, s.7). 
When ethnicity becomes nationalist, the result is the emergence of ethnonationalism. This, in 
tum, can prove threatening for the existence of the state and lead to ethnic conflict and 
disintegration, as in the case of the entire Yugoslavia (Sotiropoulou, 2002, s.2). Ghebali refers to 
the same phenomenon when characterising ethnic conflicts of the post-Cold War era. This 
combination of concepts of ' nation' and 'ethnie ', where the ethnie is considered as the archaic 
version of the nation, represents a revival of trends supposedly eradicated by modemity. 
Secondly, ethnonationalism often presents a high degree of emotionality and non-rationality. 
Thus, paraleli to ali of nationali stic reasons for demonization of the Albanians of Kosovo , the 
conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is certainly of an ethnic nature (Ghebali , 1998, 
pp .5 and 7). 
To give more examples for the theory, we can refer to the Serb elites that began to retreat from 
their support for federal institutions and openly encourage ethnic preferences for Serbs in 
response to Albanian discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo (Crawford, 1998, p .239). 
Furtherrnore, the deliberate and strategic nationalistic policies of Serbia ' s ruling elites are seen by 
Schnabel and Thakur from the United Nati ons University, asa reason for the nowadays' conflict 
in Kosovo . Those policies, having the short-term goal of securing the continuation of their own 
power, shored up the existing power structure that had been showing signs of decay since the 
mid-l 980s (Schnabel & Thakur, 2000). 
It became to be clear that Slobodan Milosevic - then head of the Serbian LCY - had responded to 
the Kosovar Serbs' appeals for help and suppoı1ed them in order to enhance his own popularity. 
By doing so, on the one hand he ev identl y discriminated the Koso var Albanians. On the other 
hand he contributed to the ethnic nationali st that had been rising at that time amongst Serbs. 
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Consequently, it resulted in the demonstrations to protest Albanian discrimination against Serbs 
in Kosovo. Taking to the street with small groups in thousands of protesters from Kosovo was 
gradually expanding to crowds and fınally it ended up expanded to as many as one million 
(Crawford, 1998, p.240). 
The riot caused by discontent due to repression of the Kosovar Albanians in combination with the 
Serbian nationalism resulted in rejection of the autonomic status of Kosovo by the Serbian 
govemment in 1989. As a consequence of that, by the summer of 1990 the Serbian govemment 
had dissolved the Kosovo assembly and purged Albanians in govemment posts (Crawford, 1998, 
p.240; Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, pp.8 and 174). From that time onwards, repressions on the 
Kosovar Albanians were continued. 
As it has been proved above, both nationalism and ethnicity play an important role in conflict 
between nations. Ali things considered, the language, the religion and the culture as a whole are 
those factors that distinguish the Albanian nation from the Serbian. Therefore, the history of 
Kosovo seen from the Albanian perspective shapes itself different than from the Serbian 
viewpoint. As a consequence of that , different are beliefs on the past of the province and so are 
the expectations regarding the future . 
1.10 Does the truth lie in between? 
It maintains clear that Serbs would consider Kosovo as the land that has been always belonging 
to the Serbian state when discussing its final status . Perception of the province as the centre of 
Serbian administration and culture for centuries would be undoubtedly an argument of the great 
impoıiance. There is no surprise neveıiheless , that the perspective of the Albanians, both living in 
Albania and in Kosovo , is entirely different. As Norris stresses, ali Albanians would strongly 
ela im that this area is a paıi of the Albanian "homeland". 
On the one hand therefore, for Belgrade, the Albanian "homeland" is the "cradle" of medieval 
Serbia inhabited nowadays b y unwelcome national minority. On the other hand, for Tirana 
Kosovo maintains the centre of Albanian nationalism and constitutes stili the region where one 
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third of ali the Albanians !ive (Norris, 1996, p.16). Apart from distinguished viewpoint on the 
history and the nativeness of the province which is crucial for the nowadays conflict between 
both nations, ali cultural, lexical and religious differences may only emphasize this inconsistency. 
in the regıon of Kosovo difficult and complex processes of restructuring the nations and 
irreversible changes in societies have been taking place. On the one hand, the process of 
Slavization of Albanians was applied. On the other hand Islamisation was experienced by both, 
Serbs and Albanians, with the greater influence to the latter nation. Whereas the Kosovar 
Muslims in Serbia, creating separated administrative units, enjoyed religious and ethnic rights 
during the Ottoman Empire, it became a problem in multinational , but stil! Slavic and Christian 
state of Yugoslavia. Therefore the process of de-Slavisation had been put into practice (Norris, 
1996, pp .11 and 19-20). Ali those changes in social structures resulted afterwards in prejudices of 
one nation to the other. 
The twentieth century did not ameliorate the relations between Albanians and Serbs. What for 
one nation constituted liberation, for the other one maintained occupation. Wbat for one nation 
was considered as enjoying its own rights, for the other meant one discrimination . Whereas for 
the Serbian scholars, the history of Kosovo maintains as ' biological and cultural genocide over 
Serbs' (Jevtic , 1990, s. 11), for the Albanians it became genocide when ethnic cleanings in !ate 
l 990s were applied . Kosovo had constituted a timing bomb in the heart of the Western Balkans 
that finally broke up. in the region, there was no go lden mean found that would satisfy both the 
Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians. On the other hand, event if there was one, in the territory 
where interpretation of the history was absolutely different by both nations, it seemed that it 
would not be a long-term solution as long as the human rights were not respected and the final 
status of the province was not established. 
1.11 Conclusions 
The history of Kosovo seen by Albanian eyes does not maintain parallel to the history of the 
region in Serbian interpretation . Competing constnıctions of history have served to perpetuate a 
climate of hatred between the ethnic Serb and Albanian communities and triggered the spiral of 
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conflict. As a result of fact that each side has maintained a perception of history as a fluctuating 
domination by one or the other side, different nations claim exclusive rights and sovereignty over 
the same pi ece of land. 
Different scholars mark different hi storical facts as a hard core and a fundamental of the conflict. 
Some of them emphasize the battle of Kosovo Polje and even more the myth of the event as the 
greatest bone of contention among the nations. Others would consider never ending struggle 
among Albanians and Serbs during Ottoman Empire as seeds of the currant confrontation. Others 
yet point at nationalism and the ethnic character of the conflict as fac tors that made it break out. 
Apart from this, some scholars refer rather to the Kosovar Albanians as the only not having their 
own republic in the multinational state of Federa l Republic of Yugoslavia. Nei ther had they split 
up from after the dissolving of the Yugoslavian state in the beginning of nineties of the twentieth 
century. It seems that when doing a research on the deep roots of the Kosovo conflict, everyone 
can argue on different aspects described in this chapter. 
It is not deniable that ali of above mentioned factors contributed to the current conflict. At the 
time of military intervention by the intemational comrnunity in Kosovo and Serbia, the province 
constituted an integral part of the then Yugoslavia. The existence of numerous disagreements 
among societies led to the military conflict. In the moment when a military intervention in 
Kosovo was initiated in 1999, the province with 10,912 square kilometres constituted 12 .3 
percent of the territory of Serbia. Population of the region stated over two milli on with almost 90 
percent of the Albanians and a few percent of the Serbs if the eve of the 1999 crisis. Kosovo and 
Metohija constitute two valleys situated in South-Westem pat of the Serbian Republic. The 
province borders Montenegro to the North-West, Serbia to the North and East, Macedonia to the 
South, and Albania to the South-West. The capital and the largest cities is Pristine, with an 
estimated 500,000 ci tizens . 
It does not maintain without signifıcance that nationalist movements have always characterized 
the history of the Balkan people . Religious idealism would just complete the overall picture of 
the Balkan Peninsula. Constructing a society based on co-operation rather that confrontation, 
wha t might have prevented the contlict, appeared as impossible to achieve as viol ence had been 
the nomı more than the exception in th e Serb-Albanian relationship. For ali that , difference in 
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perceiving both the past and the future of Kosovo by Albanians and Serbians seems to be as 
immense as the difference between the architecture ofa Muslim mosque and an Orthodox church 
that alternates in the Kosovar cities between each other. 
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2. Theoretical framework of the conflict management and third party intervention 
2. 1 Introduction 
Most of the dictionaries when defining theory refer to contemplation, a speculation, and a mental 
view. Theory may be defined as 'a conception or mental scheme of something to be done or the 
method of doing it; a systematic statement of rul es and principles be followed (Clements, 2003, 
p.9). Thus, theoretical approach by implementing its principles, explanations, hypotheses, 
proposals and ideas reflects in the practical action that is undertaken on the basis on the 
theoretical framework. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework to the conflict management 
and third party intervention and to present what we understand by intemational community and 
its theoretical role in both management and intervention in conflict. Moreover, I support 
theoretical notions by short examples of the Kosovo conflict's case, and the more detailed 
elaboration will be provided in the following chapter. By doing so, I illustrate briefly to the 
reader the link between theory and practical factors and actions in the case of Kosovo conflict. I 
attempt to present different viewpoints presented by scholars from world wide. I also use official 
standpoints on theoretical framework of intemational organisations . This contributes to the 
overall picture of theoretical approach and completes that. 
In this chapter I staıi with the review of conflict, subsequently elaborate on the intervention and 
finish with the relevance of intemational community to both of those phenomena. Firstly, I define 
conflict and provide a general typology of that. The classification 1 present facilitates putting the 
characteristics of conflict and intervention in conflict into the theoretical framework that is 
illustrated subsequentl y. This constitutes an attempt to clarify the different variables of both 
conflict and potential third party intervention. Fuıihermore, I explain the meaning of the timing 
of intervention. By thi s notion I seek answer to the question when and how the decision of 
intervention is being made and what factors are affecting the third-party intervention . 
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After intervention is decided to be applied, varıous means that third party may apply when 
intervening is presented. In this respect I start with negotiations and go through different types of 
peace operation. Apart from this I describe the consequence of non-intervening. Finally, the 
definition of intemational community and explanation of different perception of this phenomenon 
is provided. Moreover, I present a range the case most implicit intemational organisations and 
subsequently attempt to examine what role plays intemational community as well as 
organisations creating it in conflict resolution. 
2.2 Typology of conjlicts 
Conflicts between ethnic group, nations and states are not a new phenomenon. Even if such a 
conflict maintains at the low !eve!, it can tum into an aımed action in the course of time . 
Moreover, it ma y lead to international intervention into the conflict. To perceive with 
comprehension what a conflict itself means, we need to look deeply into the theory of that and 
attempt to understand what the theoretical explanation of this phenomenon is . 
A conflict itself constitutes ' a process characterized by stages of initiation, escalation, controlled 
maintenance, de-escalation and some kind of termination (e.g., settlement, resolution). What is 
more, we can distinguish between the latent conflict, the manifest conflict process and the 
aggressive manifest conflict process . The first type refers to conflicts that are developing but have 
not expressed themselves in an observed manner, even for the parties. As the second type of 
conflicts are considered those that have developed to the extend that are observed thought they 
have not expressed themselves in a violent manner. Conflicts mentioned as the third type have 
escalated from the previous ones to a vio lent !eve! of expression: although they are not merely 
capable of being noticed and experienced, they are destnıctive to parti es, resources, and others as 
well (Sandole, 2003 , p .39-40). 
Among a plethora of typologies and classifications of conflicts, the one proposed by Dennis 
Sandole seems to be the most ordered and ofa sol id structure. Following hi s explanation of the 
conflict, there is a three-pillar framework for analys ing and resolvi ng conflict at any level. Any 
particular conflict including its di stinguished characteri sti cs are located in thi s framework under 
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pillar one. The second pillar refers to the causes and conditions of the conflict . Pillar number 
three, by tum, includes intervention design and implementation (Sandole, 2003, p .39) . 
Conflict, next to cooperation, lies in heart of all communities . Cooperation, when led to malign 
end, may result in totalitarian and repressive outcomes. Conflict, by tum, when hamessed to 
benign ends and occurring within agreed rules and frameworks , is capable of generating high 
levels of creativity and positive change. Therefore, the central objective of putting conflict into 
theoretical framework is to facilitate understanding of the ambivalent nature of conflict, its 
capacity to generate creative change and high levels of personal and collective integration, as 
well as its more malign consequences when conflict becomes vicious and violent. Moreover, 
having identified characteristics and so urces of conflict, it is more likely to resolve it peacefully 
through the intervention (Clements, 2003, p .11) 
2.3 What are the characteristics of conflict? 
The first two pillars of the Sandole's three-pillar typology refer to the nature of conflict. It 
describes its characteristics as well as causes and conditions . Such a stratification of elements 
enables clear analysing of the distinguished features. Making use of the second pillar we leam 
that the more variables at different levels are invol ved to the conflict, the more complex it is, and 
consequently, the more difficult do deal with. 
To staıi with the first pillar, illustrating elements of the conflict, it distinguishes between parties, 
issues, objectives, means, conflict-handling orientations and conflict environments within which 
conflicts occur. As far as parties are considered, we can distinguish them between individuals , 
groups , organizations , societies, states and regions. In case of Kosovo we can refer to ali of those 
levels as there had been conflict between Milosevic and Rugova, Serbian and Albanian families, 
KLA and the Serbian Govemment, Serbs and Albanians in general and Kosovo itself and Serbia 
as well as between Albania and Serbia as the previous country supported the Kosovar 
underground govemment. There is also different understanding of paıiies involved in conflict, 
namel y primary, secondary and third paıiies. Primary parties are those that directl y fight , thus the 
Serbian arnıy and paıii san s from KLA in thi s case. Secondary parties are those that are not 
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directly involved, but support one of the parties. Therefore, Russia can constitute an example of 
support for Serbian govemment that controls national army and respectively Albania be 
considered as a state that supports KLA. There are alsa interested third parties that are not 
involved in the conflict when it breaks up, but they are clearly influenced by that. European 
Union can be an example for this matter. 
The issues of pillar one considers the reasons parties claim they are waging conflict with each 
other. From a plethora of typologies the most meaningful for the Kosovo conflict would be that 
issues may be suggestive of ' misattributed' conflicts, where, for instance, political leaders may 
go so far as to invent enemies in none already exist in order to stave off intemal dissent and 
remain in power. In this case, Milosevic 's manipulation of the legacy of Kosovo for many Serbs 
in the !ate 1980s, culminated in the ethnic cleanings of Albanians in the region during !ate 1990s, 
may be considered as a way to hold on to power when, during and after the ending of the Cold 
War, other communist leaders were falling (Sandole, 2003, p.45-46) . 
The objectives of the conflict apply to status-quo changing and status-quo maintaining options. 
There is a question on how a potential third party should deal with a conflict between 
in-econcilable parties where, like in case of Kosovo, one is for establishing a new state whereas 
the second one is for maintaining the province within borders of the ex isting co untry. Next under 
the first pillar are means, that can be distinguished between violent and non-violent, we can place 
fights, games and debates. In fights , paıiies consider each other as enemies and attempt to destroy 
each other. in games, the parties view each other as opponents and attempt to outwit each other 
whereas in debates they view each other as opponents and try to persuade each other. Therefore, 
in case of Kosovo, we can consider fights as the mean that paıiies employ to achieve their 
objectives. 
Another feature is the parti es' approaches to conflict handling. Parti es may be characterized by 
competition, avoidance, accommodation, compromise and/or collaboration. We may refer to 
competition as the feature that characterizes the Kosovo conflict the most meaningfully. Finally, 
we have conflict environments, distinguished between endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous 
contlict settings are those where there are mechanisms available for controlling or resolving 
conflict vvhereas in exogenous environments are few, if any, nıechani snıs of this kind. The space 
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within the conflict unfolds may include multiple environments, like cultural , religious, economic, 
political , institutional. Analysing the case of Kosovo we can refer to ali of those environments as 
the differences in those variables are clear between both nations and were already mentioned. 
Thus, the third party assessment may be an exploration of the extent to which the conflict 
environment is endogenous and then to coordinate who administer the corresponding 
mechanisms to help the parties reach a cooperative and solid outcome (Sandole, 2003, p.46-48). 
Following the second pillar, which considers conflict causes and conditions, we can distinguish 
between relatively more or less complex conflicts . The complexity of many conflict situations 
maintain of the great importance. It is also implicit to be aware of possible connections between 
levels, for example between individuals and religious or ethnic groups ' organisations and the 
state. Although conflicts may be expressed at different levels and therefore may be truly 
different, their aetiology may reflect variables operating in terms of the same set of levels. For 
that reason conflicts may be structura ll y very similar, although their sources relate to different 
needs, interests, val ues, and ideologies of the parti es, institutions and organisations. Nevertheless, 
if conflicts are caused by factors at different levels, then dealing wi th them constitute a greater 
challenge as efforts must also capture that complexity (Sandole, 2003, p.49). 
Moore argues that general ly sources ofa conflic t are either interes t-based or value-based. We 
consider value-based conflicts as those that are less amenable to compromise and integration. 
This is important when negotiating as mediators should avoid describing disputes in terms of 
value differences when possible. Yalues-based disputes can be reframed either by reinterpreting 
the issues as interests , avoiding the value elements, or by appealing to broader shared va lues. 
Interest-based disputes, by tum, can be reframed by either broadening or foc using the issues 
(Glaster, 2005b). It may be argued, that the Kosovo conflict maintains as the va lues-based one as 
its groundwork constitute rnainly religion, culture and interpretation of history. 
Such a division of the first pillar of analysing conflict cornprises a variety of different approaches 
and insights into different si tuation. Various perspecti ves on conflict are not necessarily mutuall y 
exclusive and therefore one conflict, as proved above, can be assigned to any of those variables. 
Differen t elernents ma y cause conflict at different !eve! what is , by tum, put into the second pillaı· 
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of analysing. By such a stratifıcation of factors we are able to leam more about any given conflict 
and thus enhance our efforts to respond effectively to it. 
Finally, we cannot leave that analysis without additional and important remark. What is very 
implicit when talking about conflicts is fact that they are dynamics, always changing. The 
conflict may transform from light to heavy, thus from low level conflict to an intemational one, 
\ike it took place in case of Kosovo. Secondly, the number of issues may increase from small to 
large numbers. Apart from that, what is also applicable to the Kosovo conflict, issues may also 
transform from specifıc, concrete concems to general, global politics and orientations. Moreover, 
goals are changing. In addition, the number of participants involved in the conflict grows from 
few to many, as both parties strive to increase their influence by drawing in others (Pearson 
d'Estree, 2003, p.69-70). 
2. 4 What are the characteristics of intervention ? 
Pillar three, the most implicit for this chapter, considers conflict intervention where a potential 
third party can engaged. The term ' third party' refers to a person or team of people who become 
involved in a conflict and attempt to facilitate processes leading to quite different though 
potentially interrelated outcomes. Third parties might act as consultants, helping one side or both 
sides, analyse the conflict, and plan an effective response . 
As it was already mentioned, the key aim of a potential third party is to prevent conflict from 
breaking out to the extent ofa vio lent one. As this often fails, there are numerous other options 
available to them. Among them, there is conflict management to prevent if from spreading. 
Failing that, by turn, there is conflict settlement. As the next stage we can consider conflict 
resolution, which in Kosovo is stili lagging behind military-based management. Having achieved 
that, potential third paıties may go a step fuıther working on the long-term solution and reaching 
conflict transfonnation which is leading afterwards to conflict provention: the prevention of 
deep-rooted conflict by eliminating structural violence and other underlying causes and 
conditions of the conflict (Sandole, 2003 , p.49-50). 
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Lederach expresses a similar opınıon , who perceıves contemporary conflicts as a cycle of 
confrontation, negotiations and ceasefires, which are not enough to sustain reconciliation. 
According to him, the only way to succeed in considering the long-term nature and progression 
of conflicts while transforming them and addressing the root causes. He argues that conflicts are 
not static but expressive, dynamic, dialectical and progress through stages from violent to 
peaceful. Thus, conflict transformation must consist of multiple interventions, roles , and 
functions depending on the stage of conflict being addressed (Pillay, 2006, p.56). 
Following the terminology of Boutros Ghali , who in 1992 tried to make the UN more relevant to 
the conflicts of the post-Cold War era, as violent conflict prevention we can consider preventive 
diplomac y, conflict settlement and conflict resolution refers to peacemaking, conflict 
management constitutes peacekeeping and finally conflict transformation and provention apply to 
peace-building (An Agenda for Peace). 
Another key set of types here is negative vs. positive peace. In this context, negative peace means 
nothing more than absence of something, fo r instance hostilities, that could have been achieved 
by prevention or cessatio n of actual hostilities . Thus, negative peace is what most people mean by 
peace. Posi ti ve peace, by tum, deals with underlying contlict causes and conditions to aim fo r 
provention by eliminating s tnı c tura l violence (Sandole, 2003, p.5 0-51 ). In case of Kosovo such a 
structura l violence reflec ted in the Albanian Kosovars having involuntary status of minorities, 
who were denied access to political, economic, soc ial and other resources enj oyed and controlled 
by Serbs at the same time. 
As we see above, we can put conflicts in order from very general classification to very detailed 
one. Although they may comprise different variables, they may not necessarily exclude each 
other. Using the Sandole 's three-pillar division we can analyse conflicts from its components 
through causes and conditions to a potential conflict intervention and third-party objectives. By 
illustration of an ordered structure it makes easier to explain and understand conflict itself. On the 
other hand, although there is a clear structure and a number of theories on conflicts , there are also 
dynamics existing that make often conflict uneasy to prevent by intervention and its course 
difficult to predict. 
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2. 5 When to intervene? The timing of intervention 
Although traditional interstate conflicts are on the decline, internal conflicts such as civil wars or 
ethnic conflicts are increasing. The latter ones have proven to be difficult to resolve by 
intervention. N evertheless, the cost of letting such conflicts go uncontrolled is often very high in 
both human li ves and resources. Effective means of intervention must be developed following 
changes in the nature of conflicts (Glaser, 2005a). Thus, the question is not if to intervene, but 
how to intervene effectively. 
Having known genera l division of conflic ts, both practical and theoretical problems are then how 
to prevent latent conflicts from breaking out and manifes t conflict process from escalating to 
aggressive manifest conflict process. Different stages of conflict development as well as different 
types of intervention at different stages. But first of a li , implicit factor is ' timing' of intervention 
are important here. It is clear to understand that preventing a viol ent conflict from developing 
while at the latent stage wo uld be less costly in terms of lives and other resources. Therefore the 
decision for the timing of involvement maintains of the great importance for the extemal 
interveners (Pence, 2002 , p . 1). 
Wh ich factors are affecting the third-party intervention then? The nature and degree of such an 
intervention can be affected b y capacities of the loca! population for resource mobility as well as 
social and political dynamics . The lower public confidence in the loca! administrative authorities 
is , the more intensive support and assistance are needed . Therefore, in the absence ofa reliable 
political stnıcture , the most implicit elements in the settl ement can be defined by an intervener 
and external , often international , intervention is a key element in managing continuing ethnic 
tension before the creation of an altemative structure. International assistance is also critical 
w hen local organisations do not have technical capacities and material resourc es to meet both 
immediate and long-term community needs . On the one hand, intemational community being 
involved in intervention supports the implementation of locall y initiated program for 
development and reconciliation. Elections and political refonn ata national !eve! require scnıtiny 
of intemational community . On the other hand , the responsibi lity for the control of vio lence fal Is 
on intemational peacekeep ing forces (Jeong, 2003 , p. 294-295) . 
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All things considered, the Kosovo conflict illustrates how implicit the timing of intervention is. In 
this case it took eleven years from the time when the Serbian leader Milosevic abrogated 
Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 until NATO's air strikes in Serbia to prevent further ethnic cleanings 
of the Kosovar Albanians. The structural violence, when Albanians in the province were thrown 
out of their work and were compelled to either emigrate or create parallel structures for health 
care, education and others, was often accompanied by psychical violence. This one led to 
emergence of the KLA and its attacks on Serbian police and other targets that afterwards led, by 
tum, to Serb policy of ethnic cleanings. The comments made by heads of Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that 'We ali saw Kosovo coming' clearly prove that 
violent conflict prevention did not occur in this conflict (Sandole, 2003, p.41). 
Therefore apart from questions how to intervene on different stages of the conflict, the question 
of great importance maintains when to intervene. However, the decision ofa potential third party 
if it is already time to intervene or not often constitutes an immense problem. Except for often 
lacking ofa clear mandate to justify their action, intervention in intemal conflicts violates the 
nation's sovereignty. 
2. 7 How to intervene? From preven tive diplomacy to peace operations 
As it has been already defıned , the main objective ofa potential third party when being involved 
into conflict is to prevent disputes from arising between paıiies, to prevent existing disputes from 
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. This is what we cali 
preventive diplomacy (Doy le, 2001 , p.530). Making use of negotiations, which can be perceived 
as preventive diplomacy, maintains as the first stage. Under the term of negotiations we 
understand the process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle what each should give and 
take, or perform and receive, in transaction between them (Druckman, 2003, p.193) . lt is 
considered as a foım of communication between the opposite paıiies of the conflict where both 
parties submit mutual proposals and contra-proposals and the problem is solved when the sides 
agree on the final consensus (Aronson , Wilson & Akeı1, 1997, p.396). Thus, there is an 
ambiguous relation between a process and an outcorne. 
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The role of the third party in negotiation between sides of conflicts reflects in an influential way. 
A mediator' s presence can induce flexibility if the mediator is viewed as being trustfully and 
competent, especially when the level of hostility between the parties is high . Mediators succeed 
more when their suggestions are clear and do not favour one party over the other. Finding a 
syrnmetrical compromise becomes thus an implic it factor in order to push sides to an agreement 
(Druckman, 2003, p.203). If negotiations undertaken by third party fail, there is possibility to 
apply peace operations. 
There is an unambiguous difference between possibly applied peace operations during third party 
intervention. They differ by obj ectives, measures, sources and time of operation. Some of them 
require military intervention whereas other ones refer to diplomacy. N evertheless, ali of them 
have the same final aim to put an end to conflict, establish peace and prevent from breaking out 
ofa new conflict. 
Before starting to talk about peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace-building, it is worth 
mentioning that there is another similar concept established as the enforcement measure in the 
Charter of the UN under Chapter VII (UN Charter, art.42). Peace enforcement is authorized to act 
with or without the consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a cease-fire 
mandated by the Sec urity Counci l. This mission requires use of force where military forces are 
composed of heavy armed, national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary General 
(Doyle, 2001, p.530). The main objective here is to ' maintain or restore intemational peace and 
security' (UN Chaıier, art.42). However, the measures applied in this mission may include also 
economic sanctions against a country which violates the Chaıier. Unlike in peacekeeping, ın 
peace enforcement those measures do not require the consent of the lawbreaking parties of 
conflic t. Nevertheless, since in the case of Kosovo the Operation Allied Force was a forceful 
military opera ti on, it does not ful fil the conditions for peace enforcement (Trzeciak, 2003, p.11 ). 
Even if there was attempt to apply peace enforc ement in Kosovo , it went far beyond the 
traditi onal understanding of this concept. 
Peacemaking, by tum, is the process of forging a sett lement between the disputing paıiies . This 
miss ion refers to either direct negotiati on with just the two disputants or, more often , it is done 
with a third-party mediator who ass ists wi th process and communicati on problems, and helps the 
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parties work effectively together to draft a workable peace accord (IOTPOIC). By these measures 
peace making initiatives seek to persuade parties to aıTive at a peaceful settlement of their 
differences (Doy le, 2001 , p.530). A characteristic feature of peacemaking is that citizens of the 
conflict region are getting involved in the process more and more. Although they do not negotiate 
final accords, citizen diplomacy is becoming an increasingly common way to start the 
peacemaking process, which is then finalized with offı.cial diplomatic efforts (IOTPOIC). 
The simplest explanation of peacekeeping can be put in phrase that this process means keeping 
people from attacking each other by putting some kind of ban-ier between them (IOTPOIC). 
Following the Agenda for Peace, we can define peacekeeping as "the deployment of the United 
Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of ali the parties concemed, normall y 
involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well' (An 
Agenda for Peace). Recently, a broader approach is taken and one of them is presented in 'The 
Challenges of Peacekeeping in the 21st Century' prepared by the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. It involves in peacekeeping operations also such tasks as shoring up 
basic state services, including the judiciary, civil administration and public utilities, in order for post-
conflict societies to retum to normalcy as quickly as possible (UNDPO). N evertheless, in case of 
Kosovo, the main ro le of peacekeeping operation was to provide a ban-ier between the Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbs. Such a ban-ier had been made up of neutral soldiers, whose task was simply 
to keep the two sides apart. Those soldiers acted firstly within the Implementation Force (IFOR) 
and then with the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) which in case of Kosovo constituted the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR). At the same time diplomats were striving to negotiate a comprehensive peace and 
officials attempted to implement agreed rules. 
The !ast stage of peace operations refers to conflict transfonnation known in international 
tem1inology as peace-building. Peace-building constitutes the process ofa long-term nonnalizing 
relations and reconciling differences between ali the citizens of the watTing factions (IOTPOIC). 
The main tasks reflect in fostering economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building 
confıdence among previously waITing parties as well as developing the social, political and 
economic infrastructure . Moreover, building relationships , with the focus on emotional and 
psychological aspects of conflict, that is a guarantee for preventing future vio lence and laying the 
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foundation for a durable peace, also maintains in the central point of conflict transformation 
(Doyle, 2001, p.53 0). 
Structural transformation that moves a violent conflict towards a durable peace requires devising 
and implementing various strategies like political , economic, judicial and military measures as 
well as communications and educational ones . Thus, preventive peacekeeping forces , the creation 
of demilitarized zones and peace enforcement are listed as some of the military peacemaking 
rneasures, whereas development assistance, economic sanctions and humanitarian assistance are 
considered as economic ones. Moreover, there can be political and govemance measures 
undertaken, such as building political parties and civil society, as well as judicial and legal 
measures which refer to constitutional, judicial , legal and police reforms. Educational measures , 
by tum, encompass the training of media systems, peace education and forma! education projects 
(Botes, 2003, p.278). 
Abstracting from what we can read above, one can ask if there is possibility of non-intervention. 
We fınd the immediate answer in a position paper untitled 'Leadership and the United Nations ', 
published by the UN right before the military intervention in Kosovo. We can read there that non-
involvement is an illusory option and . Avoiding of intervening to respond to violent ' upheavals 
invites those affected, whether neighbouring countries stra ined by an influx of refugees , or 
extemal players with interests in the country, to take matters into their own hands ' (Safty, 1999, 
p .132). Therefore ' doing nothing' attitude in this respect must be never a case. 
As it was already mentioned, a characteristic feature of the conflict is its dynamics. Changing 
situation requires different measures to be undertaken. Therefore the intemational community 
applies different peace operations in the course of conflict when intervening. Various peace 
operations at different stage of the conflict Jet the intemational community step by step build 
peace which has been always a priority of intervening third party when resolving conflicts. 
Although the discussed ideas are grounded in theoretical frameworks and foundational 
documents, in practice the peace building process and transfoımation of civil society must always 
fit to the particular conflict and therefore such operations may differ from each other in different 
regions and times. 
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2.8 What is international commıınity and what is its role in conflict resolution? 
It maintains without doubts that Inter-govemmental Organisations and Intemational 
Non-govemmental Organisations play a key role in shaping the world order assisting the process 
of functioning of intemational political system. Moreover, by cooperation they create a form of 
global govemance. Whereas conflict resolving is considered by some of those organisations as an 
important objective, for other it constitutes the highest priority. Who are the actors involved in 
conflict resolution? And what role do they play in this process? 
Whether assisting in conflict resolution maintains as the most implicit role of an organisation or 
not, peace and security are mentioned as the greatest objectives by ali recognized IGOs and 
INGOs. Schimmelfennig argues that in the intemational realm, the institutions of peaceful 
conflict management and multilateralist collaboration are shaped by liberal political culture. 
Moreover, these institutions are established by states having liberal principles of social and 
political order - social pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a marked-based 
economy. Only those states that base its domestic system on these principles may participate in 
what he call s Western intem ational community (Schimmelfennig, 2003, p.78). In interaction 
within international communi ty, states perceive each other as sharing the same values, norms and 
practi ces. Sharing culture of non-violent , institutionalised conflict management, libera l states are 
able to deve lop dependable expectations of each other 's peaceful behaviour. 
Apart from shared values that contribute to peaceful behaviour of states, there is also shared 
power to act. Having this said, Wallenstein proposes to distinguish between different action 
communities. üne of groups of communities he calls UN-focused communities and the other one 
is considered as based on exclusive values or power. The UN-focused community are particularly 
concerned by the matter of human right, mass refugee movements, armed conflict and justice-
based solutions to conflict. Such a communities include the leading Westem countries and the EU 
organs but al so intemational organisation as UN , UNHCR, UNHCHR as well as associations , 
media and religious societies. Such a comınunity appears to have been iınportant when setting the 
agenda for conflict resolution. This group activates the United Nations , particularly its Secretary 
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General, and gıves priority to negotiations and peace agreements, and a reluctant support to 
humanitarian intervention. 
On the other hand there is a group that constitutes a stronger value-based, democratic 
intemational community which emphasizes the importance of democracy for peace. Here 
democracy is considered as an important factor in conflict resolution and prevention as it 
maintains of common knowledge that democracies rarely fight wars against each other. 
Therefore, NATO 's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 undertaken in order to stop armed conflict 
ha ve been seen to many an expression of the ability of the democratic communities. Altemative 
to that may be a community resting on the power ofa few actors, as in organised major power 
cooperation with the leading role of the United States which is nowadays military unchallenged 
ona global scale (Wallenstein, 2002 , pp .263-267 and 269) . 
There is al so another understanding of community based on cooperation on regional and 
subregional !eve!. It reflects a 'security community' developed by Kari Deutsch which is 
understood as a ' group of political units whose relations exhibit dependable expectations of 
peaceful change, based on the compatibility of the main values rel evant to the prevailing 
po liti cal , economic and legal institutions and prac tice within the constituent uni ts ' (Deutsch, 
1957, p. 5) . The concept refers to situation of close cooperation where states maintain their 
independence and where they do not expect to use violence among each other to so lve mutual 
conflicts. The Nordic area emphasizes such an altem ative where some states joined NATO and 
others remained outside stili maintaining a tradition o f solving conflicts without violence. 
According to the report prepared by Central European University, the contribution of NATO to 
the fonnation of a security community or a conflict-free zone in Central and Eastem Europe 
should be assessed against its capacity to facilitate , suppoıi and enhance political reforms in the 
region . Furthennore, we read that 'only democratically consolidated regimes are expected to 
resolve peacefully their domestic or intemational differences ' (Bjola , 2001 , p.9). The European 
Union ma y be considered as an additional expression of the idea of security community although 
this organisation is more centralised and institutionalized. Yet, if the European Union faces a 
securit y cha ll enge, it is related to its security as a community of values - a cornmunity whose 
belonging is deterrnined b y a shared set of values (Masse, 2005) . Although in the concept of 
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security community the shared values apply to a narrower group of societies, there are shared 
experiences of dealing peacefully with conflict among the members and therefore leading to 
shared values in conflict management (Wallenstein, 2002, p.267). 
NGOs are fast becoming a vital component of the intemational response to humanitarian crises, 
especially in situation of conflict, what can be explained by growing numbers and resources as 
well as the variety of functions they fulfil. Although they cannot be expected to solve all the 
problems associated with humanitarian intervention, they can assume four fundamental roles 
during these types of crises reflected in the relief and rehabilitation function normally associated 
with NGOs, a preventive function through early waming, human rights monitoring, and conflict 
resolution activities, such as mediation and reconciliation (Aall, 1996, p.436) . By contrast, 
Anderson argues that the NGOs actions and attitudes can also exacerbate conflict. He notes that 
NGOs must choose to employ some people (and not others), purchase goods from some (and not 
others) , and target their aid toward some people (and not others). These decisions may result in 
separation of group identities, inequalities, and jealousies (Anderson, 1996, p.348). Moreover, 
publicizing human rights abuses can provoke both increased outrage and a defensive response in 
the perpetrators, and so further harden their opposition. Such publicity can also promote a 
dehumanized image of the perpetrators. 
Although the UN, NATO and the EU are seen as the main players in conflict resolution, there is a 
range of different intemational and regional organisations involved in this phenomenon. For the 
European continent an important NGO in the field of conflict resolution maintains the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that is the world's largest regional 
security organization. By its politico-military dimension of security, OSCE includes a number of 
commitments by participating states and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. 
OSCE aims not only in engagement in conflict prevention activities violence threatens to break 
out, and in brokering cease-fire in outgoing conflict, but also in promotes democracy building as 
a long-term mean for conflict prevention, and in building security in post-conflict situation 
(Hopmann, 2002 , p.8). 
Nevertheless, the United Nations maintains stili as the only organisation that is capable to 
legitimate peace operations. lts peacekeeping operations demonstrate the ability of an 
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intemational organisation to perform on the world stage with a certain degree of independence 
and with an effectiveness not always matched by state actors (Archer, 2001, p.81 ). Like in the 
Kosovo conflict, it is often the case that military intervention has been done through NATO and 
the civil administration is tumed over to the UN. Subsequent peace missions have been done in a 
multilateral framework with NATO, the OSCE, the EU and the UN (Wallenstein, 2002 , p.269) . 
2. 9 Conclıısions 
Peace and security maintains as the highest priority for the democratic world in the 21 st century. 
After the end of the Cold War survey in the field of conflict management and intemational 
invol vement in the issue developed increasingly. Effective and 'on time ' intervention play a key 
role in conflict resolution and applying peace. The ideas on conflict management are increasing 
as well as the number of organisations that would be potential third party interveners in conflict is 
growıng. 
N evertheless, most scholars perceive conflict as a normal paı1 of life, as an inevitable thing. It 
maintains for them as a process and therefore existence of the theoretical framework on dealing 
with conflict is both needed and important. Having estab lished theoretical principles to be 
followed makes facilitated dealing with the phenomenon in non chaotic and comprehensive 
manner. Fuı1heımore, a structured theoretical framework provides clear and understandable 
means to third party intervention in order to tum a violent conflict into long-term solution in form 
of peace. 
The intemational community that comprıses a great mımber of IGOs and INGOs has been 
seeking for the possibly most effective peaceful resolution of the conflict. Although the 
components of the intemational community are diverse, ali of them claim that peace and security 
constitute a guarantee for the welfare of the societies. Therefore the question if to intervene or not 
maintains not as a key one any more - it is to be considered when to intervene and in what 
manner to intervene effectively. Consequently, the division of roles that respective organisations 
play in the third party intervention maintains as a one of the great irnportance. 
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3. Intervention of the international community in the Kosovo conflict - case study 
3.1 lntrodııction 
The conflict in Kosovo maintained without reaction of the intemational community for relatively 
long period of time. Uncontrolled repressions of the Albanian Kosovars and violence from the 
Serbians did not remain without a revenge of Albanian partisans from KLA. A low-level ethnic 
conflict tumed into intemational issue. Finally, this conflict in the heart of the Balkans made to 
the top of intemational agenda. The intemational community was from that time onwards facing 
wi th the problem of resolving the conflict and settling the Kosovo question. 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the role of the intemational community that it played 
when dealing wi th the conflict since it become an intemational issue. Firstly, I provide a 
discussion on the limits of sovereignty and the limits of in tema ti ona! intervention into conflict. In 
my analytical approach I attempt to compare state sovereignty and responsibility for its 
population. Furthennore, I try to find a borderline between those phenomena and the intemational 
responsibility that reflects in intervention of the intemational community. Secondly, I explain 
how the Kosovo conflict occuned on the top of the intemational agenda. In addition, I illustrate 
how different intemational fora got invo lved into conflict and what were its roles and positions. 
Subsequentl y, I exp lain how the intemational community made decision on undertaking military 
measures in its intervention and why such a decision took place. Firstly with this regard, the 
intemational law applying to the armed intervention is illustrated. Secondly, I try to answer the 
question who was the decision-makers in this case. For better understanding of such a decision, 
the preventive diplomacy measures that preceded the military intervention are provided. In my 
explanation I argue on why negotiations in order to prevent war in Kosovo failed. Apart from 
this , the objecti ves of the international community when negotiating the end of the air campaign 
are presented. Moreover, I illustrate factors that contributed to signing an agreement on ending 
the war. Next. the settlement of the conflict and its status after the war are considered. Finally, l 
provide the main objectives to be implemented when peace building as we ll as the role and aims 
of respective components of the intemational community during thi s process. 
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As the role of the international community in intervention in the Kosovo maintains as the highest 
objective of this chapter, the details regarding the air campaign from the technical point of view 
are omitted. Instead of that, in my conclusions I compare the legal framework of military 
intervention in conflict with the case of Kosovo . In my explanation I attempt to argue that even if 
the intervention of the intemational community in the Kosovo conflict has been not legitimized, it 
ma y be justifıed. 
3. 2 17ıe limits of sovereignty and the limits of intervention 
Among a number of attributes of a state , sovereignty maintains undoubtedly as a one of great 
importance. Sovereignty is considered as the exclusive right to exercise supreme political 
authority over a geograp hic region, group of people, or oneself. The idea of sovereignty refers not 
only to independence of the state authority in when making decisions in the scope of acting 
wi thin the state, but also to independence from different states and institutions when making both 
internal and extemal decisions regarding a given state. Therefore the territorial specification 
illustrates that the limits of this authority are indeed based upon boundaries between clearly 
demarcated units. On the other hand the legitimate part of the definition reflects the recognition 
of sovereign ty, as the concept ulti mately has to be accepted by the international community of 
states and understood in the context of the world whose actions it governs (Djuranovic, 2002, 
p.6). 
As Djuranovic rightl y notices, the fırst clear conclusion that can be drawn from a revıew of 
literature on state sovereignty and intervention is the following: ' no serious scholar in the field of 
political sc ience actually believes that state sovereignty is absolute and the territorial boundaries 
ofa state inviolable' (Djuranovic, 2002, p .5). This ass umption may be considered as an important 
starting point for a discussion of sovereignty and military intervention as it demonstrates 
unambiguously the impact of a changing world order on the noıms that affect international 
actors ' behaviour. 
Changes in the world order ca use changes in the traditi onal understand ing of sovereignty as well 
as in the defi nition of humanitarian intervention. ln order to find a proof for that we may follow a 
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repoı1 to the United Nations prepared by the lntemational Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), sponsored by the Canadian govemment. Under the title 'The Responsibility 
to Protect ' it asserts that ' the emerging principle in question is that intervention for human 
protection purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases , is supportable when major 
hamı to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or 
unwilling to end the hamı, or is itself the perpetrator ' (ICISS, 2001, point 2.25). Although such 
an approach clearly vio lates the nıle of state sovereignty, it provides a moral duty, of even further 
by calling it of responsibility, to protect human rights and promote peace. 
Paradoxica lly, a responsibility to protect the basic human rights of the country's population may 
be also incorporated into definition of sovereignty. Moreover, it can be perceived as a factor that 
constitutes legi timate intemal authority. Defining this intemal authority factors into deciding 
what comprises a legitimate violation ofa state ' s tetTitorial boundaries have always constituted a 
dilemma. Therefore, the attempt to establish the ro le of intervention in intemational affai rs is a 
trial to discem the exact limits of state sovereignty (Dj uranovic, 2002, p.6-7) . 
Humanitarian intervention might thus indeed stop human rights abuses violating a state 
sovereignty in the name of moral responsibility. This can be easi ly used as an argument in the 
case of Kosovo. There is another paradox in this respect. Although this operation had stopped 
Slobodan Milosevic 's ethnic cleanings, it did not halt the Kosovar attempting to drive out the 
remaining Serbs. Therefore Ignatieff asks: ' What is the point of assisting people to be free if they 
use their freedom to persecute their former persecutors?' (Ignatieff, 2003 , p.5 1-52) . Peter Pham 
also argues that that intervention can exacerbate, rather than reduce, the humanitarian crisis by 
intensifying the !eve! of violence within a conflic t and thus increasing the domestic securi ty 
threat and spreading regional instability (Pham, 2006, p.26). 
Apaı1 from the above mentioned critic of Pham, he presents a range of challenges, dilemmas and 
weaknesses of intervention when analysing thi s phenomenon. All of those features of 
intervention have irreversible results for a state sovereignty. Maintaining aware of that , 
intemational community ma y treat those factors as limits of intervention . Firstly, he claims that 
'since most violence is perpetrated more qui ckly than cornmonly realized , an intervention will 
almost inevitab ly co me too !ate for man y, if not most. victirns'. Nevertheless , even if it was the 
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case in Kosovo conflict, instead of answering to this hypothesis we can simply ask the question : 
how many would-be victims did it save? Secondly, he is critical about interventions that address 
symptoms rather than underlying causes. He argues that a humanitarian intervention is capable to 
stop human rights abuses , refugee flows , and material insecurity, but it cannot secure societal 
transformation as the ongoing tensions like those between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo 
demonstrates. 
Moreover, he mentions that intervention opens the political space to new, often unexpected, 
actors. Outside intervention, by displacing the old political order, allows new forces to emerge. 
Having this said, he presents an argument against common responsibility by presenting own and 
various interests of thi rd parties when intervening. Another drawback, lntervention ma y foster 
criminal 'warlordism' and that has afflicted Kosovo since the NATO intervention drove out 
Serbian forces. Furtheımore , intervention constitutes the starting point for a complex political 
process whose eventual end point cannot be predicted. Apaı1 from that, economic progress will 
be diffıcult if the intervention distorts pre-existing incentive structures. In addition, he says that 
although Interventions may have significant impact on trust, social capital, and the character of 
society, it is difficult to produce positi ve effects directly. Finall y, international commitment to an 
interventi on will wane over time. When interventions are multilateral , it is inevitable that the 
contri buting parti es wi ll necessarily be acting under the influence of di fferent moti vations, even if 
they ali refer to humanitarianism asa reason of invo lvement (Pham, 2006, p .23-27) . 
Ali things considered, a great number of present forei gn policy enjoys such intemational 
consensus as humanitarian military intervention despite plenty of limits. Military intervention and 
other types of superiority of international community overwhelmingl y based on the Westem 
states, especiall y the US, easily appear in particular in the underdeveloped countries where 
humanitarian crises usually occur and where the sovereignty maintains weak. N eveı1hel ess , it is 
not the case that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct. However, the whole concept has been 
experiencing a range of redefiniti ons in order to remain applicable and relevant to the 
increasingl y global problems of most nations. Thus , debates over what state sovereignty means in 
practice and when intervention is legitimate, gain additional impoı1ance when they are viewed 
through pri sm of mır own moral s, interests and views on what kind ofa world we would like to 
!i ve in. 
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3. 3 How did the Kosovo issııe make it to the top of the international agenda? Internationalisation 
of the conflict 
Many argue that the intemationalisation of the conflict that broke up in Kosovo came too !ate and 
it is relatively easy to agree with such an assumption. For the very first time the Kosovo conflict 
was put on the intemational agenda by the Contact Group in September 1997. The group 
consisted of the United States , France, Gerrnany, Britain, Italy and Russia (Arbatov, 2000, p.15). 
It maintained as a supervisor of the implementation of the Oayton peace agreement. The 
institution was busy with implementing agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and not before that 
date the situation in Kosovo was discussed as a separate issue. 
In the statement issued on 24 September, the Contact Group warrned for the outbreak of Kosovo 
violence ·in the province and insisted on a peaceful dialogue on Kosovo status. The group 
expressed itself that it neither supported independence, nor did it support maintenance of the 
status quo. It presented its support foran enhanced status for Kosovo within FR Y under condition 
that such a status will fully protect the rights of the Albanian population in accordance with 
OSCE standards and the UN Chaıier. Intemational organisations that subsequentl y expressed 
itself with regard in the Kosovo issue supported a so lution for the future status of the province 
within the political structure of the FRY with 'greater degree of autonomy ad meaningful self-
administration ' . The viewpoint that Kosovo sho uld maintain within the FRY borders was shared 
also by Milosevic. N evertheless, shoıi after the first weekend of bloodshed in early March 1998, 
he against intemationalisation of he Kosovo problem and stated that the province was an intemal 
affair of his country, in which the intemational community had no ıight to interfere (Leurdijk & 
Zende, 2001, p.28-29). 
Not before January 1998, NATO applied the issue of Kosovo in its agenda. Sixteen ambassadors 
of the NATO countries devoted their weekly meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to 
Kosovo . In March they stated already that ' NATO and Intemational Community ha ve legitimate 
interests in development in Kosovo in ter alia because of their impact on the stability of the whole 
region which is of concern to the Alliance ' (Leurdijk, 1999, p .9). This statement laid the basis for 
fı.ııiher in vo lvernent of the paıi of the intemational community with the situation in the province, 
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and subsequently became the main issue of diplomatic and military involvement, where a wide 
front of intemational institutions would participate with aim at a political settlement of Kosovo 's 
future status. At the same time various intemational fora started getting involved in discussion of 
the issue of Kosovo: the United Nations Contact Group (CG), NATO, the United Nations 
Security Council (SC), the G8, the EU, and the OSCE (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p .27). 
Meanwhile, since in the beginning of March 1998 when the Serbian police had started excessive 
violence against the civil popu la ti on in Kosovo, attempts of the intemational community to halt it 
maintained unsuccessful. Firstly, the CG ordered Milosevic to take 'within ten days ' series of 
steps such as withdrawal of the special police units from Kosovo , access to Kosovo of the Red 
Cross and of other humanitarian organisations, to start dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians and 
to enable intemational community a more active involvement in dealing with the situation in 
Kosovo. To the same demands referred the UN Resolution 1160 accepted on 3lst of March, 
which calls alsa far a peaceful solution by dialogue as well as far accepting 'a mission by the 
personnel representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office far the FRY' and 'facilitating a mission 
to Kosovo by the UNHCHR' (UN Resolution 1160). 
Those statements of the intemational community maintained without any reaction from the 
Serb ian side . Not only Milosevic did not implement the steps suggested by intemational 
organisations, but the bloodshed in Kosovo did not stop. From this time on the intemational 
debate on potential use of military measures became lauder and lauder. Not because the first 
measure reflected in preventive diplomacy in form of negotiation failed, but so far there was no 
one to negotiate with. 
3.4 How the decision of military intervention in Kosovo conjlict has been made? 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states as follows: 'Ali Members shall refrain in 
their intemational relations from the threat or use of force against the tenitorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other rnanner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations ' (UN Charter). The only two exceptions frorn this rul e are ascertained in the 
Chapter VII of the Charter and refer to self-defence in Article S 1 and to enforcement measures 
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ordered by the UN in articles 43 -4 7. Therefore according to the intemational law no military 
action apart from those two cases must be undertaken. 
A failure of intemational community's attempt to halt the violence in Kosovo resulted in raising a 
debate on potential military intervention by NATO in the province and different possible options 
to be applied there. The question regarding the intemational legal basis for such an action was 
also whether an explicit authorization by the Security Council would be needed. A similar debate 
took place on the fundamental relationship between NATO and the UN Security Council. 
Simultaneously, in June 1998, Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State, expressed her 
position during NATO's ministerial meeting in Luxembourg. She stated that 'NATO's 
fundamental mission will always remain collective def ence against aggression'. She added that 
' if joint military action is ever needed to protect vital alliance interests, NATO should be our 
instrument of choice' (Leurdijk, 1999, p.9) . 
Having this said, the US Secretary of State clearly questioned a need fora UN authorization for 
NATO to act in Kosovo. The US Secretary of Def ence, William Cohen, shared the same view, 
emphasizing NATO's own autonomy in taking decisions. Nevertheless , the US position was not 
in !ine with ali within NATO. Others claimed that they wou ld not approve of the use of forc e by 
NATO without a UN mandate firstly because of fear the risk of alienating the Russians, among 
others, and secondly, the consequences such a precedent could set for others, like the Russians 
again, in the future . Those concems were substantiated as Russia and China expressed its 
objection in regard with using NATO forces in Kosovo. 
Meanwhile , at the beginning of June 1998, the United Kingdom circulated a draft of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) authorising 'ali necessary measures ' to stabilize 
situation in Kosovo and halt ethnic cleanings. Few days before that Russian Foreign Minister 
Primakov announced that the deployment of the NATO troops in the region must not be 
undertaken without authorisation of the UNSC. This point is hared by China . President of Russ ia 
Boris Jeltsin , by tum, responding to the British proposal went a step fuıiher saying that his state 
will block moves at the UNSC to authorise use of NATO military measures in the province. 
France has also reservation about a NATO military intervention in FRY. Meanwhile, the EU 
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announced aban on new investments in FR Y and a regulation on the freeze of funds (Leurdijk & 
Zende, 2001 , p.177-178) . 
On 12 June, the Contact Group agaın called on the FRY to implement its suggestions agaın 
referring to apply the dialogue between Serbian and the Kosovar Albanians leaders as well as to 
facilitation the safe retum of refugees and displaced people to their home, what should be in 
agreement with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intemational 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Those two institutions, along with the World Trade 
Organisation, were denied by the Serbian police access to a couple of main cities in Kosovo , 
having medical supplies confiscated. During the meeting with Jeltsin in Moscow, Milosevic 
agreed on fulfilling those two points made by CG, namel y full and unimpeded access for 
humanitarian organisations and facilitation the unimpeded retum of refugees . He also promised to 
resolve ex isting problems by political means on the basis of equality for ali citizens and ethnic 
communities in Kosovo. 
Not later than within few days, Serbia moved additional troops to the province, such as police 
buses and armed trucks with heavy artillery. CG in its statement from 8 Jul y urged Belgrade to do 
more to fac ilitate the retum of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, although there has 
been some improvement in the access to Kosovo fo r intemational humanitari an organizations 
such as UNHCR and ICRC. it noted nevertheless, that neither withdrawal of security fo rces used 
fo r civilian repression has been canied out, nor rapid progress in the dialogue with the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership has been achieved (Contact Group Statement, 1998) . Meanwhile, in August, 
NATO conducted a five-day military exercise in neighbouring Albania to show its readiness for 
action . 
After fruitful cooperation between intemational community and the FRY had not been noted, the 
violence had not been halted , and some 200 to 300 thousand displaced Kosovars hiding in the 
mountains had been reported, the intemational community took another steps. At the end of 
September the UNSC adopted resolution 1199 under Chapter Yii , announcing further action and 
additional measures if demands of UNSCR 1160, a ceasefıre in Kosovo , and a safe return of the 
refugees, \Vould not be met (UN Resolution 1199) . By mid-October, President Milosevic and 
Holbrooke. the US Ambassador to United Nations, reach an agreement on ful! compliance of 
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with UNSCR 1199 and forming the Kosovo Yerification Mission (KVM) by the OSCE to 
supervise election s and other tasks in the future . This agreement was reached after informal 
meetings of NATO Defence Ministers and after NATO SG Solana expressed an agreement 
between NATO Ambassadors on suffıcient legitimacy for military intervention without an 
explici t mandate ofa UNSCR (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.184). 
Facing no reaction on withdrawal the Serbian forces from Koso vo, on 15 October NATO urges 
Mi losevic to reduce hi s forces in the province within two days under a renewed threat of air 
strikes. The period before execution of air strikes until evening on 27 October. Meanwhile, 
UNSC adopted resolution 1203, where among others it approved the deployment of unarmed 
observers in Kosovo in framework of KVM and air supervision of unarmed NATO planes in 
order to monitor the withdrawal of Yugoslav armed forces and the Serbian police (UN Resolution 
1203). Milosevic had agreed to cease fire and partial withdrawa l of the FRY forces on the very 
!ast day. Therefore air strikes were called off at the !ast minute. OSCE had deployed KYM to 
monitor the agreement and NATO developed operation on a potential evacuati on of KVM when 
needed (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001 , p.1 85). 
The year 1998 ended with unsuccessful negotiations that which took place already from June 
onwards. At the beginning of the 1999, situation in Kosovo changed dramatically. First armed 
incidents between civilians in Kosovo broke up . Massacre of 45 Albanians in the village Rucak 
took place. Having this condemned, the Head of KVM had been recognised by Milosevic as 
'persona non grata' and ordered to leave the country. Under those circumstances, NATO had 
decided to increase its readiness and reinforced its air assets preparing it to the air strikes. The 
vision of NATO troops in Kosovo was under discussion in the US and Europe as a way to halt 
violence and urge both sides to negotiate. European allies , however, were balking at supporting 
air strikes against FRY unless the US agreed to be part of multinational gro und force in Kosovo. 
At the end of January, the Ministerial Contact Group issued a proposal for peace talks between 
FRY and the Kosovar Albanian leaders . it was scheduled to start not longer than before 6 
February in Rambouillet . Meanwhile, the violence did not stop in the province and NATO 
announced i ts full readiness to undertake mili tary action (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p. 186- 18 7). 
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As we leam from the coming subchapter, the negotiations under intemational mediations had 
failed and while the violence was continued. SG Solana had directed NATO forces to start the air 
attack on FRY that happened the following evening. Analysing the decision that had been taken 
on initiation of military intervention in conflict in Kosovo, we can conclude that it had been made 
by the NATO with the US leadership, with big support of the Great Britain and France. The UN 
is the only organisation to authorize such an intervention and among resolutions that it adopted in 
regard with this conflict there was no resolution authorising the military intervention. I will 
analyse la ter in this chapter if such an authorisation was required in the case of Kosovo conflict. 
It maintains neveıiheless obvious that NATO played the most implicit role in this intervention by 
the character of the intervention itself. Judging regional organisations that were involved in the 
Kosovo conflict, we see that their ability and authority to intervene are widely different. The EU 
represents a very potent economic and political force and by those measures intervenes in 
conflict. Other organizations like the OSCE are better suited for auxiliary support during 
peacekeeping missions, monitoring and supervision of undertaken humanitarian actions, and as 
general agents of conflict prevention. A simple reason for that reflects in fact that most of these 
organizations cannot wield an anned forc e capabl e of intervening. Therefore organisations like 
the OSCE usuall y work within the fra mework of the United Nations, either working on 
preventati ve measures befo re the arm ed conflict enıpts , or entering the scene after much of the 
po litical and military uncertainties have been resolved (Djuranovic, 2002, p .25-28) . 
3. 4 Why did preventive diplomacy in the Kosovo conjlict fail ? 
Before the decision of military intervention has been made by intemational community, the 
negotiations took place. An objective of mediators during negotiations is to make parties of 
conflict signing such an agreement that enables to prevent the conflict from breaking out or to 
halt spreading it. But first off ali there must be will of the parties of the conflict to undertake 
negotiations. First attempts of intemational community reflected in numerous visits of European 
politics in Belgrade that took place before June 1998, when both KLA and Milosevic were urged 
to start negotiations in order to stop violence in province as vve ll as dri ving thousands of 
Albanians from their homes. 
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The position of the major powers at that time was that there cannot be independence for Kosovo 
taken under consideration and therefore the Kosovar Albanians should leadership should enter 
talks with FRY to obtain greater autonomy for the province (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.175-
179). Representatives of the U.S. Administration, Slobodan Milosevic, and Ibrahim Rugova 
shared an interest in preventing the legitimating of the KLA by excluding its representatives from 
the negotiations. It became obvious soon that it could not be the case any more after the KLA had 
effective control of the countryside and substantial funding from the Albanian diaspora 
community and became the driving force in the region (Special Report 33, 1998). Therefore KLA 
was now considered as a party of negotiations next to Milosevic and Rugova and the KLA itself 
considered intemational mediation as a condition to negotiate. 
In July, Holbrooke starts his shuttle diplomacy by meeting Milosevic in Belgrade, without any 
results. This initiati ve came nevertheless after a long peri od during which the Kosovo issue was 
ignored by intemational community (Special Report 33, 1998) . At the beginning of September 
the US Envoy Christopher Hill meets with Milosevic in order to urge him to stop violence in 
Kosovo . At the end of the month the EU appoints the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade 
Wolfgang Petritch a Special Envoy for Kosovo, who will assist the US negotiator. Diplomatic 
missi on by Hill failed to reach agreement on greater Kosovo autonomy in December 1998 
(Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.179-186). Meanwhile, violence in Kosovo maintained continued and 
plans of intemational military intervention into conflict by UN and NATO were under 
preparation. 
After armed fights between civilians and massacres of Albanians in Kosovo from the very 
beginning of 1999, the key negotiations start on 6th of February in Rambouillet. At the same time 
NATO was fully ready to take military action to stop further violence. The main objective of the 
Peace Conference was to reach agreement on a three-year interim period settlement based on 
Hill ' s proposals. It contained 'a substantial autonomy for Koso vo', while maintaining the 
teıTitorial integrity of the FRY with stationing of the intemational force under NA TO-command 
and disam1ament of the KLA. In the course of negotiations, NATO, Russia and FR Y agreed to 
four basic principles : the teıTitorial integrity of Yugoslavia, its sovereignty over Kosovo with the 
granting of broad autonom y to the province, the wi thdrawal of the major paı1 of the Serbian 
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army, and retum of refugees under intemational protection and humanitarian relief (Arbatov, 
2000, p.10-11). 
The key point of disagreement between parties was the deployment of NATO forces in Kosovo. 
Although Hill vis ited Milosevic to convince him to accept the stationing of NATO troops in the 
region as well as the US and European allies tried to urge both sides to accept a peace accord to 
Kosovo in order to avoid NATO bombing, no agreement has been signed by 23 February, when 
the conference finished. After the peace talks were resumed in Paris 3 weeks later, the Albanian 
delegation signed the Rambouillet Agreement. At the same time Milosevic made move in 
opposite direction, building up his troops in Kosovo that makes the peace talks suspended 
(Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, pp .34-35 and 176- 189). We can conclude the failure ofnegotiations by 
recalling a dialogue between Holbrooke and Milosevic from 22 March during the final waming 
talks. Holbrooke was quoted as telling the Serbian president, 'I want to be clear with you, it [the 
bombing] will be shift , it wi ll be severe, it will be sustained '. To that, Milosevic replied, 'There is 
nothing more I can say ' (Kaufman, 2002, p.185). On 23rd of March, after meanwhile two rounds 
of Holbrooke-Milosevic talks without results , the NATO Secretary General Solana directs its 
forces to initiate air opera ti on in FR Y that becomes fulfilled on the evening next day. 
The Rambouillet negotiation talks were perceived asa deadline to obtain a peaceful solution for 
Kosovo . However, Chomsky, basing on repoıis, claims there were two proposals on the table on 
the eve of the bombing. Apart from the Rambouillet accord, presented to Serbia as an ultimatum, 
there was also Serbia's position, formulated in its 15 March 1999 'Revised Draft Agreement' and 
the Serb National Assembly Resolution of 23 March 1999. The reso lution had been kept from the 
public eye and there was little indication even of its existence, !et alone its contents . Supposedly, 
the Resolution, except for condemning the withdrawa l of the OSCE monitors , called also on the 
United Nations and OSCE to facilitate a diplomatic settlement through negotiations ' toward the 
reaching ofa political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo , with the securing ofa 
ful! equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and with respect for the sovereignty and 
tenitorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. Moreover, 
it considered the possibility of an international presence ofa size and character to be detem1ined 
to carry out the "political accord on the se l f-nıle agreed and accepted by the representatives of ali 
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national communities living in Kosovo '. It maintains hard to admit whether these proposals had 
any substance, since they were never considered, and remain unknown (Chomsky, 2000). 
As we see above, neither striving of the intemational negotiators for a peaceful solution nor the 
peace conferences Jet avoid of air strikes of NATO in FRY. For some, like Tim Judah, the failure 
of negotiations was entirely surprising. He claimed that ' at that time it seemed almost a foregone 
conclusion that Rambouillet would succeed '. As arguments he presents altematives that for Serbs 
would reflect in ıisking NATO bombing and for the Albanians it would mean leaving them to the 
mercy of the Serb forces (J udah, 2000, p.197). Some argue the main reason for which negotiation 
did not succeed was the fact that the Kosovo problem had been fora long period largely ignored 
by the in tema ti ona! community in favour of focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina (Special Report 
33, 1998). The emergence of the KLA has changed the situation in Kosovo rapidly and 
dramatically and so did ethnic cleanings applied by Milosevic. This left the intemational 
community well behind the curve. Therefore we can argue that the intemational involvement in 
the Kosovo confli ct was to less to prevent it from am1ed intervention and the idea of 
implementing preventive diplomacy came too !ate. 
The Rambouillet agreement, by tum, is sometimes thought of as a model for a loose association 
of Kosovo linked to Serbia as an altemative to independence. Even thought , Albanians have 
considered the agreement to be obsolete as it provided limited though significant presence of 
Serbian troops in Kosovo. Having maintained responsibility for Kosovo's defence and extemal 
relations, Belgrade wo uld retain an important role the affairs of the province (Seli, 2000, p.12). 
Ali things considered, the negotiation failed as 'give' and 'take' in transaction between parties 
attempting to establish the status of the region, had been seen by them at unequal !eve!. 
Moreover, third-party mediators could not establish a compromise accepted by both sides of the 
conflict thought they did not favour clearly of any of those sides. Neveıiheless, the proposed 
agreement expressly intended as a transitional one, not as the pem1anent solution to the issue of 
the Kosovo 's status. 
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3. 6 What to do with Kosovo? The settlement of the Kosovo question 
On 24 March NATO air strikes initiated a military operation that ended after 78 days. Whereas 
NATO forces were hitting Serbian targets , the FRY forces were driving the Kosovar Albanians 
from their houses, what resulted in 118 thousands displaced Albanians after one week of the 
operation. it grew to more that 1.5 million displaced people reaching 93% of population of 
Kosovo, in the eve of on agreement to stop attacks at the beginning of J une 1999. 
Although Russia condemned attacks on the very first day of the operation, few days afterwards 
air strikes were increased after no reactions on halting violence by Serbia. Nevertheless, Russia 
played a key role in negotiation talks afterwards. it took more that two months to find a 
consensus on the final agreement. There was a number of proposals prepared in this time and ali 
of them called for cease fire and halting violence and repressions in Kosovo, establishing an 
agreement that would approve presence of intemational peacekeeping forces, enabling a safe 
return of the refugees and assistance of intemational humanitarian organisations. Since the 
beginning of May, when Russia took a role of mediator between Belgrade and NATO, any 
attempts to resolve the problem were failing as Milosevic would not accept NATO forces in 
Kosovo (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001 , p.190-198) . 
On the 28 May, during a meeting between Chernomyrdin, the Russia 's Representative for the 
Kosovo crisis, with Milosevic, the latter one agreed on the general conditions proposed by 
international community. Although the proposal for the peace plan submitted by the G-8 did 
hardly differ from the previous drafts , the main reason why Milosevic changed his position were 
changed circumstances under which he found himself. Firstly, Russia had accepted not only 
NATO 's demand of complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav-Serbian forces from Kosovo, but had 
also indicated that stationing ofa peace support force under NATO supervision, that was so far 
not acceptable for Russia , would not be vetoed any more. No longer Milosevic was dealing with 
divided international community and realised his intemational isolation was complete. Secondly, 
he was facing with a possibility of the deployment of the ground forces that has been wide 
discussed wi thin NATO. Thirdly, although there was no foıınal cooperation between the KLA 
and NATO, the Albanian paı1isans must ha ve passed information on possible targets for the air 
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strikes, as the effectiveness for hitting am1ed vehicles and artillery of Serbia was growıng 
increasingl y. 
Furthermore, there was intemal opposition. Not only there were occurring the Serbian soldiers 
fleeing from Kosovo, but also Montenegrin president Djukanovic, who openly opposed to the 
Milosevic's regime, threatened wit a peaceful secession of his republic from the Federation. 
Finally, a day before talks with Chemomyrdin, Milosevic had faced indictment by the 
Intemational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, pp.88-95 
and 198-200). All those factors contributed to achieve the final agreement on 3 June signed by 
Ahtisaari, Finnish President representing the EU, Chemomyrdin and Milosevic. The Parliaments 
of FRY and Serbia adopted it the same day and agreed on all demands of intemational 
community including an intemational security forces with a substantial participation of NATO, 
under unifi ed command and control (Zwanenburg, 2004, p.46). FRY started to wi thdraw its 
forces from Kosovo what would finish within seven days and then NATO officially ended its air 
campaıgn. 
This agreement Jet the UN adopt the Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999. The resolution was 
adopted with 14 in favour and wit abstention of China. The document authorised the UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. It contained interim civi l administration to be led by 
the UN, humanitarian affairs under supervi sion of UNHCR, the EU- led reconstruction, and 
institution building to be led by OECD (UN Resolution 1244). This document paved the way for 
the entering of a new stage in the conflict that would reflect in implementation of the interim 
phase envisaged in the demands package. The objective of the package was to establish an 
intemational protectorate in Kosovo with military and civilian involvement of the intemational 
community under auspices of the UN. 
The interim agreement for Kosovo constituted an attempt at ' post-conflict peace building '. The 
Military Technical Agreement, by turn signed on 9 June, constituted a basis for KFOR that 
entered Kosovo three days la ter. The main objectives of intemational security forces contained in 
the agreement supposed that KFOR will 'operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the 
authority to take ali necessary action to establi sh and maintain a secure environment for ali 
citizens of Kosovo and otherwise cany out its mission' (Aı1. 1 (2) of the Military Tecbnical 
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Agreement). KFOR was also asceıtained to monitor as well as to verify and when necessary, 
enforce compliance with the agreements that ended the conflict, and to provide assistance to the 
UNMIK. The safe environment was a necessary condition for the retum of refugees and 
displaced persons as well as for the deliverance of humanitarian aid and for the activities of the 
intemational civil organisations. Among military tasks of KFOR were the enforcement of a 
cease-fıre and the withdrawal of Serbian military and police units (Art. 2 of the Military 
Technical Agreement). After the NATO-KLA Agreement on 20 July, the task of KFOR was also 
the supervision of demilitarisation of the KLA partisans (Art.3-7 of the NA TO-KLA Agreement). 
KFOR troops come from NATO and non-NATO nations and include Russian soldiers . 
The military presence in the province was needed to enable unimpeded action to be undertaken 
by international community under supervision of UNMIK. On the website of the mission we read 
that it was unprecedented and that 'no other mission has ever been designed in which other 
multilateral organizations are full partners under United Nations leadership' (UNMIK, 2003). 
Already in June 1999, during his speech in Vienna, SG Kofi Annan claimed that 'we are invo lved 
in a long-term proposition ' and 'we will be on the ground at least for several years. But the 
reconstnıction of Kosovo in the region, in my judgement, will take at ieast ten years' (Kofi 
Annan, 1999). üne can conclude that Annan was right at least in fırst point - intemational 
community indeed maintains already for six years in the province and in this yea r is supposed to 
hand in the authority over Kosovo to the loca! authorities. This will happen when the final status 
will be established after the long process of implementation of the assumed objectives. 
Nevertheless , how long the process of reconciliation of inhabitants of the region will take, 
maintains to be seen. 
3. 7 Conc!ıısions 
ln the case of Kosovo conflict, the international community was forced to use military measures 
in order to stop violence in the province after the negotiations fora peaceful solution failed. The 
air campaign that was conducted by NATO resulted in Yugoslavia 's acceptance of peace 
conditions laid down in a previous conference . After the end of the air strikes a NATO-led force , 
KFOR, 'Nas stationed in the pro vince. Although Kosovo reınained technicall y a paıt of Serbia , 
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intemational regime was created for the province. The Albanians could retum to the region. The 
Serbs remaining in the area could stay under intemational protection. However, many chose 
leave . 
NATO recognizes this armed intervention in Kosovo as 'most effective air operation in history' 
(USDDR). The final resolution reaffirmed Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty 
under the auspices of the UN by changing the status of Kosovo and restoring its autonomy for the 
first time since 1989, and mandating the deployment of an armed peacekeeping force in the 
province under the international supervision. Nevertheless , the war in the province triggered an 
important legal debate on the legality of international community to intervene in a conflict that 
broke up in a sovereign state considering that there was no authorisation of the UN for 
undertaking such an action. B y contrast, the role of responsibility of the intemational community 
was under discussion. Pro f. Legault explains that while NATO's action is ' objectively illegal , 
there are nonetheless certain bases fo r that action that are not legal , but justified' (Lega ult, 2000, 
p.64). 
Analysi ng intervent ion of intemational community in this conflict, Wallenstein claims truly that 
' in Kosovo the US chose together with the UK to act entirely outside the UN framework in a US-
led air campaign aga inst targets in Kosovo and the rest of Y ugos lavia'. Air strikes constituted an 
attempt to prevent an outgoing violence in Kosovo from tuming into another protracted Balkan 
conflict. Nevertheless he proposes a range of argumentations to justify thi s intervention. It might 
be possible to argue that NATO was ac ting in self-defence on behalf of the Albanian population 
that was driven out from their homes in Kosovo as they could not defend themselves. This 
explanation refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Another argument mentioned by him is the 
fact that situation in Kosovo was extreme and military actions were the !ast resoıi after 
negotiations has failed . Yet another argument can be that humanitarian concems now are as 
legitimate as others fo r intervention in another country, even against the will of an intemationall y 
recognized govemment. Therefore, he concludes that although the intervention in Kosovo was 
not in accordance with the letter of the Charter, it may ha ve been in accordance with the spirit of 
humanitarian prioriti es (Wallenstein, 2002, p.259-260) . 
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Trzeciak goes even further in his analysis of the behaviour of intemational community in the case 
of Kosovo conflict. He argues that ' humanitarian intervention takes place when there is a threat 
to intemational peace and security, in particular when there is a risk of conflict spreading to other 
states or an exodus of refugees that threatens political and economic stability in the region' . 
Therefore although on the one hand intervention vio lates sovereignty, on the other it may be 
considered as an effo ı1 to protect the state 's sovereignty, namely its populace from the effects of 
civil war or a renegade govemment . He distinguishes also of confusing peacekeeping and 
intervention . While the first one is directed towards maintaining peace, peace enforcement tries to 
enforce it , the purpose of humanitarian intervention is to relieve the suffering resulting from a 
situation of conflict or anarchy. For this reason peace operations should be examined separately 
as humanitarian intervention can not be regarded as a part of the peace-building process 
(Trzeciak, 2003, p.l 1-12). 
The di lemma of whether to intervene or not maintains nevertheless by occasion on every conflict 
of this type. However, it may be easier to answer the question if the ro le of intemational 
community asa guarantee for peace and security was fulfilled rightly and if the decision of armed 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict was wise when we consider what would be a result of not 
undertaking such a measure. Job claims that the altemative was to Jet massacres, ethnic cleanings 
and acts of genocide run their appointed course, spreadi ng war in the region (Job, 2002, p.238). It 
may be also argued that the conflict in Kosovo changed both notion of sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention. We ma y say after Djukanovic that 'sovereignty comes wi th 
responsibility and that states who do not fulfil these responsibilities can expect to face increased 
pressure to do so from the intemational community, in some cases even culminating in military 
intervention' (Dj ukanovic , 2002, p.21 ). However, is sti ll up to the intemational community as a 
whole to decide whether responsibility entails providing a country's citizens with basic human 
rights affirrned in the UN Chaı1er. 
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4. The role of the international community in post-war Kosovo 
4.1 lntroduction 
The intervention of intemational community in Kosovo conflict and subsequent agreement on 
ending the war, constituted a beginning of its involvement in the Kosovo issue. A challenging 
mission came when the peace-building process was supposed to be applied. Intemational 
community was aware that the task it had been facing did not seem easy. Although many 
predicted its difficulty, intemational community was not able to manage the problem in its all 
aspects. 
The objective of this chapter is to illustrate the role of the intemational community in the peace-
building process in Kosovo. Firstly, the security-building is illustrated. With this respect different 
tasks and measures undertaken by intemational actors as well as effectiveness of such a process 
are presented subsequently. Apart from that, I analyse involvement of the intemational 
community in the process of building democracy. Also in thi s case different objectives and ways 
to achieve them by respective actors are distinguished. Subsequently I refer to the intemational 
community and its ro le in reconstnıction of economic and socia l system in Kosovo. With this 
respect I illustrate main components of the international community and their contribution and 
anangement in this process. 
In the second part of the chapter I analyse the question of the final status of Kosovo. Firstly, I 
present general trends regarding the problem as well as the options that had been taken under 
consideration. Furthennore, l illustrate strengths and weaknesses of such options. Subsequently, I 
refer to involvement of intemational community in this issue. Moreover, I present different 
attitudes and behaviours of intemational players that took position in regard with resolving 
problem of the final status of Koso vo. 
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4. 2 International commıınity and security in Kosovo 
Shortly after KFOR entered Kosovo, the intemational community created a loca! administration 
under its control and, in July 1999, established the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), which 
played an exclusively advisory role. Subsequently, in December 1999, the UNMIK, headed by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, signed an agreement with Albanian parties 
considerably expanding the composition of the KTC and establishing the Interim Administrative 
Counci l (IAC), a quasi govemment subordinated to UNMIK (Balcer, 2003 , p. 50). 
The UN in its position paper from 2003 stated that the !eve! of politically motivated violence has 
significantly decreased over the previous two years . N evertheless, erime continued to be a 
problem, with the levels of housebreaking increasing. It claimed that intemational workers were 
not being targeted not necessary because of what they stand for, or their particular organisation, 
but because the criminal element has identified them as having substantial assets that are worth 
stealing. Fuıiher in paper we read that there were stili a substantial number of weapons in the 
province. KFOR and UNMIK police continued to make regular seizure of weapons and 
ammunition as a result of organised searches, or stop and search operations (UNMIK, 2003, 
p. 17). Arrns control , including confıdence and securlty-building measures in Kosovo, has 
demonstrated also an impoıiant role that the OSCE plays in post-conflict stabilisation in the 
province (D una y, 2006, 43-44) . Police numbers on the street continued to increase steadily, with 
the new Kosovo Police Serv ice appearing in much more significant numbers than before. It stated 
also that increasing number of Police and a substantial KFOR presence minimalized the risk to 
personal safety (UNMIK, 2003, p.17) . 
Events from the spring and summer of 2004 confirrned that stabilisation in Kosovo is by no 
means yet assured. Ethnic riots in the province erupted in March, leaving 19 dead, about for 
thousands of the Serbians minority driven from their homes and substantial damage to propeıiy , 
including the destnıction of 730 houses and 29 religious buildings (Batt, 2004, p.116) . UNMIK 
and KFOR failed in their mission to preserv e other and protect citizens' security, undem1ining the 
credibility of the intemarional community and its objectives. Since that time omvards it was clear 
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that Kosovo's uncertain status has become the key challenge to the stabilisation not only of the 
province itself, but of the whole region (Batt, 2004, p.9). 
Those events, however, for the first time in the contemporary Balkans, constituted popular 
hostility and violence that was clearly directed towards representatives of the intemational 
community, from both UNMIK and KFOR. Albanian leaders have expressed fears that they 
would not be able to control a repeated outbreak of violence. It was clear for the international 
community that it must never Jet such events erupt gain as it would be a strong possibility not 
only of breaking out violence between ethnic groups, but also violence directed against 
international workers. (Butt, 2004, p. 87-88). In early July of 2005, a series of bomb attacks in 
Pristine were directed against UN and OSCE facilities. This event again questioned the 
effectiveness of international community in keeping security in the region. Rugova had been 
stating fora long time already that 'NATO should stay in Kosovo forever' (Sell, 2000, p.17) . 
The intemational community has officially stuck to the concept of a multi-ethnic Kosovo in 
which non-Albanians would be treated as equal to the Albanian majority, and not as national 
minorities in an Albanian Kosovo (Balcer, 2003 , p. 51 ). This position, which the intemational 
community has been taking since the beginning of the Kosovo crisis, is nevertheless under 
criticism of Gllogovci 3. He sees it as the biggest mistake of the intemational community since it 
has been involved in the crisis . He says that trying to create a multi-ethnic society is pointl ess as 
such a society already exist in Kosovo since centuries. The problem and the conflict are in-
between two ethnicities Serbs and Albanians this is the point where focus should me made, and 
on very concrete problems that people in Kosovo face (Gllogovci , 2006). 
4.3 Jnternational community and democratisation process in Kosovo 
When talking about democratisation we can break the term down into two dependent variables: 
transition and consolidation. The first one, a democratic transition, refers to a move from a non-
democratic regime to a democratic one. It encompasses the creation of new rules regarding 
political participation, which, in tum, are not subject to a review by a non-democratic group oran 
institution. As far asa consolidation of dernocracy is considered, it connotes a longer anda more 
3 lsak Gllogovci is tlıe Secretary General oftlıe Yo utlı Europeaıı Federali st in Kosovo. 
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complex process and entails the 'legitimation' of these new rules, that is , a moment when 'ali 
politically significant groups adhere to democratic nıles of the game'. Vucetic claims that if one 
refers to the Balkans, the buzzword has been balkanisation, not democratisation . These two can 
be seen as opposites: democratisation may be considered as a move towards stable, centripetal 
political systems that allow for peaceful alteration in government, whereas balkanisation often 
refers to violent, petty-minded fragmentation and polarisation (Vucetic, 2004, p .116) . 
This regularity regarding Balkans does not facilitate the mission of the international community. 
Neither does it fact that Serbia's democratic revolution was never going to be a 'velvet' one. The 
country is emerging from the decade of ethnic war that entrenched the excessive power of 
politicised military and security apertures (Batt, 2005 , p.57) . The objective of the international 
community was nevertheless to face the problem in spite of murky past of the Serbians . 
In October 2000, Kosovo Serbs bo ycotted municipal elections. N evertheless, the elections were 
seen as a test of the ability of the Albanians - to play by the rul es of the democratic game. It 
seemed it was a test that they passed as on the day of the elections as about eighty percent of 
registered voters turned out, many waiting patientl y in !ine for hours thanks to unnecessaril y 
compl icated voting procedures . What is more, after the electio n, both winners and losers behaved 
responsi bly: Rugova said he wo uld move cauti ously in exploiting hi s victory while Thaci 
promised to respect the results of the election. 
Seli highlights that the inability of intemational community neither to include Serbs in the 
administrative stnıctures establi shed in Kosovo , nor to protect them properly, has been the 
international mission ' s biggest failure in Kosovo. However, Kosovo Serbs have not made it easy 
for the intem ational community to help them in process of democratisation. This assumption can 
reflect in the fact when at the same time boycotted the elections in Kosovo, they participated in 
the September FRY electrons, voting heavily for Milosevic . These elections nevertheless led to 
Milosevic' s downfall (Seli , 2000, p.8). This downfall of was implicit not only for Serbia and 
Koso vo, but also for the entire region . With the democratisation of Croatia following the death of 
Franjo Tudjman in No vember 1999 and the victory of democratic forces over Milosevic in 
September 2000, ali the countries in the Balkans had democratic govemments. (Batt, 2004, 
p.113) 
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Following the objectives of the intemational community, in May 2001, after consultations with 
Albanians and Serbs, UNMIK adopted the Constitutional Framework, which came into force as 
of the date parliamentary elections were held in November 2001. This new law established the 
president's office and a govemment whose competencies included the economy, health care, 
infrastructure, public administration and education. Subsequently, the chief of the UN mission 
was supposed to gradually transfer most of his competencies in the economic sphere to local 
authorities. This process commenced in early April 2003 and was immediately criticised by the 
Serbs as being premature. On the other hand, the Albanians were dissatisfıed with the absence of 
a guarantee that the other competencies reserved for the head of UNMIK would be transferred as 
well (Balcer, 2003, p. 50). 
As far as democratisation and governance building is considered, the OSCE was appointed to 
take the lead role in this process (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p.108). Pal Dunay stresses that 
although the organisation can not intervene effectively during the 'acute' phases ofa conflict due 
to available means, it well equipped on post-conflict rehabilitation. Therefore, even if the si lent 
diplomacy or democratisation building process is less visible, this role maintains of great 
importance. Dunay claims that especially process of building confıdence and security hold by 
OSCE succeed in the region and transparency of the process was significant there . it is sufficient 
to mention that in 2004 almost half of the fıeld resources of the organisation ha ve gone to South 
Eastern Europe where a big percentage of that was destined to Kosovo . Nevertheless , the OSCE 
could not take a proactive stance in the forthcoming resolution of the final status for the province. 
This is caused by the fact that no decision could be agreed upon on Kosovo at the OSCE 
Ministerial Council meeting in December 2005 (Dunay, 2006, pp. 23 and 64). 
Essential for the process of democratisation of Serbia, within which Kosovo existed, was 
cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which in the 
case of Serbia was lacking. Although the international community expected Serbia to be ready to 
cooperate with the ICTY in order to break with the past, Serbian politicians have seen it as a 
destabilising threat to a fragi le democracy. Actua ll y this s ituation only begun to change recentl y, 
in the spring of 2005 , when Kostunica's government fınally decided to move, and more than a 
dozen long-awaited indictees were included to suJTender 'vo luntaril y' to The Hague. 
Nevertheless, Radko Mladic, the key indictee charged with responsibility for the massacre over 
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seven thousand people in Srebrenica in July 1995, and few other remaining Serbian indictees, are 
stili at large (Batt, 2005, p.58). 
üne need to remember that democracy is a leaming process, not an 'off-the-shelf product. 
Gllogovci suggest nevertheless, that the attitude of the parties that are goveming Serbia now did 
not show serious efforts for reforms. He claims that opposition is even worse, cooperation with 
the Hague tribunal in Karadic and Mladic case does not exist. This fact have left an immense 
impact not only on Montenegrins, who had good relationship with Serbia for centuries and in 
May 2006 decided in referendum on 'velvet divorce' , but the situation is also essential for the 
Kosovar Albanians (Gllogovci , 2006). 
Indeed, in Serbia progress in transition is burdened by additional tasks in a country whose 
borders are ill-defined and whose sovereignty over its tenitory is not yet assured. As an example 
for lacking of serious efforts for reforms, mentioned by Gllogovci, may be the fact that the 
Serbian Parliament voted to change the emblem, flag and anthem of the republic only in August 
2004 - until then Serbia stili had an emblem with by the red star (Batt, 2004, p.42) . It clearly 
illustrates that changes ha ve been slow and difficult. It is nevertheless due to the magnitude of the 
agenda. A new Serbian constitution, to replace the existing one forced through Parliament by 
Milosevic in 1990, is stili in the making. 
4.4 !nternational community and reconstruction of economic and social system 
According to assumption of Resolution 1244, the EU was responsible for the process of 
reconstruction of economic and social system (Leurdijk & Zende, 2001, p. l 09). At the very 
beginning it is worth mentioning that the EU enjoys the trust of more people in Serbia than any 
other intemational organisation. When asked whether Serbia should join the EU, a very high 
percentage of Serbians in recent years regularly say 'yes' - around 72-76 percent, as compared 
with 8-13 percent who would say 'no' . Moreover, although only half of them trust the EU, it is 
nevertheless a much higher proportion of support than for any of Serbia's own national political 
institutions (Batt, 2004, p.66) 
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Kosovo is included in the EU's Stabilisation and Association Process . The province benefited 
from the various instruments of this policy framework, including trade preferences, the European 
Commission assistance as well as reform monitoring and recommendations. The Commission 
devised the Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo (STM) in 
2002 so as to provide technical assistance and political guidance on Kosovo's path to implement 
EU-compatible practices and regulations. This confiımed further deepen involvement of the EU 
in the province in order to boost EU-compatible structural reforms there. What is more, between 
1998 and 2002, the European Community committed over 1.2 billion Euro assistance in favour of 
Kosovo. The Community is the largest donar with this respect (EC Occasional Paper, 2004, p .74) 
But still , in comparison to the EU average, per capita GDP calculated at the official exchange rate 
for Kosovo stands at only 4 per cent. Nevertheless, since the year 2000 there has been an average 
real growth in GDP of 4 .5 percent per year, but it is worth noting that the starting point was 
extremely low. Moreover, this can be explained by fact intemational donations and remittances 
from the Kosovar Diaspora during the fırst years after the 1999 conflict were maintaining on the 
high !eve!. This is nevertheless not the case any more. Meantime, contributions have already 
decreased from 975.7 million Euro in 2000 to 120.2 million Euro in 2003. There are no long-term 
resources for public investments, nor is there a strategy for generating investments from ava ilable 
fınancial resources. UNMIK, by tum, and specifical ly Kosovo Trust Agency, which is supposed 
to handle the privatisation, is hesitating and the Provisional Institutions of Self Govemment, 
namely the Kosovar govemment, do not have the authority to undertake major privatisation steps. 
This is stil i because they would very probable neglect Serbian claims (Butt, 2004, pp . 70 and 83). 
in order to make the situation in Kosovo stab le, and to resolve its status question in the future, 
there is also immense need to implernent reforms in Serbia itself. It is also under responsibility of 
the EU to continue to search for ways to help those refom1s and future-oriented dernocrats to 
address the challenges that confront them. This involves not only more substantial funding, that 
can be comparable to the pre-accession funds , but also much more intense intemational interface 
and interaction at ali levels to accelerate the dynarnics of integration, maximalize Serbia's 
potential to make up lost ground , and thus finally secure stability of this troubled regıon of 
Europe (Butt, 2004, p.52) . 
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The attempts of implementation of Europeanisation are seen as a useful process for this purpose. 
Nevertheless, the prospect of the EU membership is relatively, as well as realistically, much too 
long. Initiatives coming from Serbia are absolutely necessary, apart from great efforts from the 
UE side . Among required reforms, Serbia needs to improve the quality of the legal framework 
and combat corruption (Batt, 2004, p.87). However, the international community, in particular 
the EU, must provide substantial economic development aid. In this respect, the continued 
absence of any long-term solution to the Kosovo issue that both Albanians and Serbs can !ive 
with, threatens to do immense damage for Kosovo and Serbia. If the union is to be remained, the 
EU position has been always that it would only negotiate with a functioning union of the two led 
to paralysis . 
Not only has the EU supported economic and social reforms in Kosovo. In autumn 2003 the 
Contact Group in cooperation with UNMIK, attempted to turu the 'mantra' of 'Standards before 
Status' into an operational policy. Standards Implementation Plan, adopted at the end of March 
2004 by UNMIK the Provisional Government, obligated the latter to offer a 'road map' to 
ambitious reforms (Batt, 2004, p. 117). But the violence in the province that happened at the same 
time, constituted a sev ere setback for Kosovo. N evertheless, 'Standards before Status' remains at 
the core of the international community's strategy. It has become clear that it needs to be 
complemented by a proactive approach to some of the key problems, such as security of 
minorities, effective loca! government, the empowerment of Kosovo's fledgling institutions and 
the urgent economic and social problems. 
4. 5 A final statııs of Kosovo - the essentia! problem to be solved 
Before staı1ing discussing involvement of the international community in the question of the final 
status for Kosovo, I want to stress one essential fact: although the unsolved status of Kosovo is 
now the key issue for Serbia , region and the intemational community, there is no visible 
development in resolving the problem since the very beginning when it occurred. The position of 
Pristine and Belgrade did not change. The previous one \NOtıld not accept anything but 
independence for the province, the latter one claims that it will not sign Kosovo away. 
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A number of scenarios on the Kosovo final status question ha ve been already presented, but none 
of them is acceptable for both sides. A status of an autonomous region of Serbia is completely 
unrealistic because such a situation, as once was already experienced, would led to the increased 
tensi ons between Kosovo Albanians and the Serb govemment and finally ended in a state of war. 
An autonomous region in the Republic of Yugoslavia, so then status form 1974-89, which de 
facto would not provide a right to secession, and in result for future independence, is not 
acceptable by Albanians. None of those options makes sense any more as Montenegro decided on 
secession from the Republic . For the same reason, the status of the third republic within the 
common Yugoslav state is not taken under consideration any more. Neither canonisation non 
paı1ition solves the problem as it would create separation and with high probability again 
violence (Triantaphyllou, 2001, p. 26-27; Seli, 2000, p. 12-14 ). 
As long as independence is considered, there is clear scenario for that: referendum in which the 
population will be asked whether it is for or against full sovereignty of Kosovo as a new state. 
Any altemative for independence in form of loose association is not acceptable by Pristine. 
Belgrade states opposite and referring to events from March 2004 argues that 'if the intemational 
community is not capable of protecting them we shall ha veto do it ourselves (Batt, 2004, p. l 09). 
Such a situation caused a number of problems that the intemational community is facing with this 
respect. Belgrade claimed that if Kosovo becomes independent against wi ll of Serbia, the same 
procedure may be implemented in Srpska Republika in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Batt, 2004, 
p.95-96) . This is undoubtedly not to be accepted by the intemational community. Another 
problem constitutes fact that political crisis in either Kosovo or Macedonia would see the 
Kosovar leadership again reasseıi political primacy over the Macedonian Albanians. Neither this 
is what the international community wants to see. 
in spite of many attempts of the intemational community to fınd a golden mean for the Kosovo 
status, positions have not changed. The Kosovo parliament threatened to declare independence in 
the spring of 2003, while in August 2003 the Belgrade parliament adopted a reso lution 
maintaining that the only acceptable future for Kosovo was within Serbia and with Serbian troops 
present there . Therefore although the negotiations have staı1ed already in October 2003 in 
Vienna , little progress was achieved and forma! contacts came rapidl y to a halt (Batt, 2004, 
p. l 09). 
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4. 6 The international conımunity and the qııestion of the final statııs far Kosovo 
After events from March 2004, the US and the EU concluded that the status quo was 
unsustainable. Russia also came round to this opinion. (Batt, 2005, p.37). Following that, 
in spring 2005, Serbian President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, realising 
the real situation in Kosovo , formulated their position regarding the issue as 'more then 
autonomy, less then independence' (Batt, 2005, p.40). Although the international community saw 
a room for negotiations in this attitude, in practice it meant nothing more than confırming 
Belgrade's disagreement for full independence for the province. 
The intemational community is itself divided in opinion regarding the future of Kosovo. The 
United States as a first intemational player had a c\ear view on the future of Kosovo. Pro-
American sentiments of Albanian political elites, as well as its support for Washington's policy 
following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and during the Iraqi eri sis resulted in fact, that the 
US is calling for independence for Kosovo (Balcer, 2003 , p.57). On May 2005 the US, 
expressing itself about the future of Kosovo, called upon the EU to come up with a 'courageous 
and creative' deal which would give Serbia requisite incentive to engage constructively in the 
upcoming negotiations over Kosovo (Reljic, 2005b, p.3). At the same time the US, after many 
meetings of the Contact Group, presented for the first time the timetab le for the negotiations and 
deliberation process. Bums, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said that 
Kosovo's status should be determined by the end of 2006. (Altmann, 2005 , p. l) 
The United Nations appeared to be ready to approve Kosovo ' s independence more than any other 
organisation (Balcer, 2003, p .58) Although the UN's decision from 2002, that precise standards 
for democracy and human rights must be met before negotiations begin, has in the meantime 
watered down , the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative Soren Jessen-Petersen claimed 
the fulfılment of the basic standards in Kosovo in his special report that was presented to the 
Security Council on 27 May 2005 (Altmann, 2005, p. l ; Reljic, 2005a, p. 1) 
The European Union is believed to approach Kosovo 's independence aspirations with more 
scepticism than the United States and the European Comımınity is divided itself (Balcer, 2003 , 
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p.58). The EU frorn its side is uneasy to take over responsibilities in Kosovo after the end of the 
UNMIK rnandate . it is also against transforrning UNMIK into EUMIK, in other words tuming 
Kosovo into an EU protectorate. An argurnent frorn Brussels is that the EU lacks the 
adrninistrative capacity to do so (Altmann, 2005, p .6; Reljic , 2005a, p.2). lt is not yet prejudged, 
what would be the opinion of France, Spain and Turkey on the Kosovo issue, as these countries 
also face separatist movements. 
Russia in thi s process is expected to convince Belgrade to make necessary concessions. This 
creates the situation in which Moscow, in the UN Security Council , can only give its content to 
one of Belgrade's results. Russia cannot vote against a solution proposal that Belgrade has 
already accepted. By doing so, it would only make it clear that it is acting in its own interests 
regarding Chechnya and Abkhazia, where it fundamentally rejects any kind of separation. The 
same goes to China and the question of Tibet (Altrnann, 2005, p.6; Reljic , 2005a , p.2.) 
The US is clearly showing its impatience. Although it leaves the question to be resolved by 
Europeans, a relatively active pro-Albanian lobby in Washington is rnaking the most of this 
position, arguing that the creation of an independent Kosovo is the most important contribution 
foran ultimatel y stab le order in the Balkans (Altmann, 2005 , p.6).In response on that, the private 
US think tank Intemational Crisi s Group (ICG) argued that the US should take unilateral action 
in recognizing Kosovo's independence and wi lling European countries sho uld be asked to fo llow. 
Such an alliance should be prepared to ignore all oppositions in Belgrade, Moscow and Beijing. 
According to the ICG it is the only alternative to renewed violence in the region. Nevertheless, 
such a position can be problematic if we refer to current si tuation in Iraq : by support for the 
independence of Kosovo it makes precedence fo r the dissolution of Iraq (Reljic , 2005a, p.2.). 
General conclusion is that the intemational community, represented in negotiations by the UN 
Security Council and the Contact Group, has so far avoided clear position regarding the question 
of the final status for Kosovo . Neveı1heless , the international community has defined four clear 
premises for th e negotiations. Firstly, there will be no return to the pre-March 1999 status, so then 
under th e Serbian ro le. Secondly, the paı1ition of Kosovo into ethnicall y pure Serbian and pure 
Albanian parts will not be accepted. Thirdly, irnrnediate and unc onditional independence is not 
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on the table. Finally, there will be no union of any kind between independent Kosovo and other 
Albanian-populated areas, or with Albania itself. (Altmann, 2005 , p.3) 
4. 7 Conclusions 
The chapter illustrates the difficulty of the task of the intemational community that it is fulfilling 
in Koso vo. Peace-building process, a!though with great efforts, is very slow. Implementation of 
objectives faces numerous obstacles in spite of immense investments and financial contributions. 
Taking over subsequent responsibilities by the loca! authority causes unhappiness in Belgrade. 
Any interventions from the Serbian side are not welcomed in Pristine. 
Multilateral intemational community ıs ın great measure effective in building stability and 
securi ty in Koso vo . Neverthel ess, memory about the past war is stili alive in multi-ethnic 
population in the province. This factor does not facilitate the task the intemational community is 
facing. Therefore single acts of violence in the region remain. There is no wonder neverthel ess 
that democracy in Kosovo matures slowly. By definition, democracy is not the phenomenon that 
can be implemented to the soc iety wi thout its will , or by force. Moreover, without support from 
society, there is no poss ibility to build institutions that would work effectively. However, th is 
seems to be the case in Kosovo as the society itself is divided. There is no common attitude of the 
Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs. What is seen as help by one ethnic group as an 
intemational help, for the others constitutes 'foreign occupat ion' . 
Economic situation remains in very bad condition. A big rate of unemployment altemates with 
very low GDP. in spite of great financial contribution that had been done by intemational 
community, and in particular by the EU, there is stili a !ot to invest in. Decreasing financial 
support in recent years may only contribute to deputies in the region , not to combat them. 
Although stable economic situation in the Kosovo society would not be a guarantee for achieving 
entire security, it would undoubtedl y increase it. 
Stili unknown final status for Kosovo is another, and now the most important factor , that 
contributes to strained relations between th e Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, both in the province 
and in Serb ia itse lf. Although th e yea r 2006 was supposed to be seen as a 'decision time' for the 
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question of Kosovo , it is not yet prejudged if this will happen. On February 17, the President of 
the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, called for compromise regarding the question 
of the final status of Kosovo to be found between Serbs and Albanians . The negotiations were 
launched soon afterwards under auspices of the UN, but no compromise was found. Neither was 
any concrete conclusion done after the negotiations in March. This clearly illustrates that the 
situation in Kosovo is stili far for normal and that further involvement of the intemational 
community in necessary. 
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Conclusions 
This paper constitutes a discussion on involvement and the role of the in tema ti ona! community in 
the Kosovo crisis. With the course of time, the attitude of the intemational community towards 
the Kosovo issue, as well as the actors involved, has been changing. Therefore, there were also 
changes in objecti ves, tasks, and in the proposed solutions for the conflict resolution. In my 
conclusions I would like to illustrate multidimensional changes which have been taking place and 
my proposals for objectives and tasks that intemational community should focus on with regard 
to those changes . I will also argue that the European Union should take a leading role in dealing 
with the Kosovo issue . 
As it was emphasised in my elaboration, the intemational community still in mid-1990s took a 
position that the problem of Kosovo should be solved on the Belgrade-Pristine !ine. The 
intemationalisation of the conflict took place in !ate 1997, j ust on the eve of the ethnic cleanings 
conducted by the Serbian police on the Albanians in Kosovo in February 1998. An actual 
intemationalisation of the issue, the consideration of the conflict in NATO agenda, and the first 
UN resolution on that issue occurred afterwards in March 1998. The intemational mediators 
became involved in the summer this year and talks on a peace agreement took place in Febnıary 
the fo llowing year. Considering the ethnic character of the conflict, as well as it impetus, ali those 
initiatives came too !ate. This nevertheless could have been caused by the fact, that relatively few 
people from outside of Kosovo, even joumalists and politicians, had a clear picture of the reality 
in the province. As a result, the intemational community had reacted too less and too !ate. 
Judgements were therefore difficult and hasty, wrong conclusions were drawn and wrong 
solutions were suggested. 
Changes within the province caused by violence had become irreversible and therefore an armed 
intervention was unavoidable. The US took the leading role in NA TO's air operation that took 
place without authorisation of the UN, thought it adopted a resolution confııming the peace 
agreement. Russia was entirely against military intervention, albeit it played an essential role in 
negotiations on ending the war. Apart from appointing a mediator who contributed to those 
negotiations, the role of the EU at this stage of the conf1ict was neither clearly visible, nor was 
70 
there a common position of the Community. Some states, like the Great Britain and France, 
supported NATO's air strikes, whereas other countries, like Greece, stayed in opposition to that 
and were calling for ending the war. Nevertheless, it became to be clear that the role of the EU in 
the peace-building process will be a leading one. 
Such an attitude of the EU towards the issue may be nevertheless easily explained by the fact 
that, in the time when the contemporary conflict in Kosovo broke up, not only the deterrnination , 
but also capability of the EU was lacking. Therefore the direct decisions to threaten and then to 
use force in order to halt violence came from the US . The conditions for ending the conflict, 
although fo rmally proposed by the Contact Group, were originally drafted in Washington . 
Neverthel ess, after the intervention, the EU had been gradually taking over the initiative in the 
peace-building process, though the peacekeeping operations are stili conducted nowadays by the 
KFOR soldiers, coming from 35 NATO and non-NATO nations. 
The year 2000 can be considered asa tuming point in the EU-Balkans relations as the policy of 
the Community towards the region became more coherent and proactive. Although at the time of 
disso lution of Yugoslavia in early 1990s there had been little expertise of the Balkans in most 
European Foreign Ministries, in the co urse of the intensive work on the Balkan issue throughout 
the 1990s, the EU had developed a common analysis and conc lusions regarding the general 
approach to the region . A li the EU Member States had leamed lessons from the Balkans and, as a 
result, shared interests in the stabili sa tion of the region gradually came to the fo re. The EU's 
abi liti es to respond rapidly to new developments and to cooperate with loca! actors and 
international partners increased after the position of the High Representati ve for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy had been established. Apart from that, the Community had also 
developed its operational capacity in civilian and military crisis management. The EU deployed 
the new instruments for the first time in the Balkans and there was no coincidence in that. In the 
spring 2003 , the EU took over the police operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the UN. 
Furthern10re, in December of the same year, the EU established the police mission in FYROM, 
which was formed after the military presence of NATO had been taken over by the Europeans . 
Meanwhile, in .Tune 2003 , the EU-Balkans surnmit took place in Thessaloniki . In the concluding 
document of the summit, the Community clearly expressed its position that the future of the 
Balkans would be in the EU. 
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Different attitudes of the international actors towards the conflict in Kosovo may only confirm 
the specificity and the difficulty of the conflict. In their attitudes, organisations and individual 
states often refer to the theory regarding conflict management. Although we have the entire 
theoretical framework for understanding conflict and resolving it, as well as for the third party 
intervention, every conflict is unique and there are also factors that cannot be predicted, what 
reflects among others in dynamics of conflicts. Different interpretation of the sum of variables 
that constitute a conflict results in different approaches on its resolution. Consequently, lessons 
learnt from one conflict can be used it the other. Therefore, I deem that perception on conflict 
management and resolution constitutes also a process, a kind of continuity as theory effects 
practice, albeit practice brings factors that have been not predicted in the theoretical framework. 
Those factors afterwards create theory, which is again used by the actors as a base for practical 
actions. I can admit therefore that theory on conflict management and third party intervention will 
evaluate as long as the world will deal with conflicts, though it will remain as a starting point for 
that process. Thus, theory will not be always implemented in practice as factors happening in 
practice cannot be always predicted by theoretical framework . This has been proved in the case 
of the Kosovo conflict. 
Changes in perception of Kosovo and the whole regıon by the intemational community, 
especially by the EU, have been affected b y multidimensional changes that took place on the 
Balkans itself. Increased involvement of the EU in the region was caused in great measure by the 
fact , that after the death of Tudjman in !ate 1999, Croatia became independent. Moreover, after 
the downfall of Milosevic in the following year in democratic elections, all the countries in the 
Balkans established democratic governments. The situation in the Balkans has been still 
changing. It seems that in Jamıary 2007 Bulgaria and Romania will become the Member States of 
the EU. Even if the European Commission will decide to delay the accession, those countries will 
join the Community at latest in January 2008. In such a situation the Westem Balkans will 
constitute an enclave in united Europe. Thus, the EU will either succeed in absorbing this region 
successively into its own stnıctures or will risk importing instability in various forms, including 
uncontrolled migration and illegal traffıcking. Therefore, the EU should pay an ımmense 
attention on tlıe situation in the region and focus on cooperation with it. 
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Furthermore, there are essential changes in the federation of Serbia and Montenegro , and in the 
Serbian state itself. As the Montenegrins decided in May 2006 in democratic referendum on 
creation a new independent state of Montenegro, there is nothing what remains after the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia any more. This was preceded by the fact that in March the same year 
Slobodan Milosevic died. Along him, the ideology of great Serbia as well as the symbol of ethnic 
cleanings in Kosovo has been buried. N evertheless, the political culture and democratic reforms 
in Serbia are far from the E uropean standards , although the great majority of the Serbs would see 
the future of their state in the EU. On the other hand, critics from Belgrade and elsewhere in 
Serbia claim that the perspective of the Membership watered down after France and the 
Netherlands had rejected the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. They argue that it will 
slow down the process of integration of the Balkans with Europe as Brussels will focus on 
deepening the European cooperation, not on widening it. If this is what the EU will do , ın my 
opinion such an action would be wrong. 
There is immense need for cooperation with Serbia as the situation in the country as well as its 
position on the intem ational arena is stili uncertain . But Serbia itself does not help the EU with 
this respect. Offi cials in Belgrade express their will to join the EU in the future, whereas at the 
same time they do not want to cooperate wi th ITCY and deliver the criminals from the war time 
in front of the co urt . Acco rding to th e ITCY, the Serbian authoriti es have information on place of 
staying of Radko M ladic but they do not want to pass the info rmation to The Hague. It resulted 
subsequentl y in the fa ct, that the EU rej ected the association talks with Serbia in May 2005 after 
the April deadline for delivering M ladi c had passed. Such a situation will not help in finding a 
common solution of the final status of Kosovo that , although under international protectorate, still 
remains within the borders of the Serbian state. 
Finall y, al! those alterations are visible a lso in Pristine . But the situation in Kosovo itself is 
changing as well. Partisans from KLA are not a major national military force any more. What is 
more, Ibrahim Rugova, the indefatigable fi ghter fo r independence of Kosovo and the form er 
infornıal president of the province, died at the beginning of 2006. This creates a situation that 
none of main players from negotiations in Rambouillet will be by th e table when negotiating the 
final status of Kosovo any more. In order to stabili ze situation in th e province, the international 
communit y. again especiall y the EU, has been invest ing in great state in enhancing democrac y 
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and security in Kosovo, what would contribute to the future negotiations on its final status . Such 
an attitude is caused by the fact, that the criminality in the province is stili very high and the 
events from March 2004 constitute an example for that. What is more, very recently, in !ast day 
of May 2006, a young Kosovo Serb was killed by the Albanians when coming back from the 
town of Zvecan to the village where he lived. This illustrates the situation of Kosovo that the 
intemational community is facing. Moreover, Marek Antoni Nowicki, a former Ombudsperson in 
Kosovo , when leaving the province at the beginning of 2006 after fi ve years of service, claimed 
that what he had left behind was a state of affairs in which the protection of human rights were 
stili at pitifull y low levels, far below even the minimum intemational standards. Therefore the 
security in the province remains of the essential importance and the final status of Kosovo must 
be established as soon as possible. If it intemational community waited for too long, deadlock at 
best and confrontation at worst might be a result. Moreover, in combination with persistent 
economic crisis it might well lead to a new crisis. 
In comparison with ali those altemations , I have to admit that the changes do not apply to one 
question: there is no change in negotiations regarding resolution of the Kosovo conflict by 
establishing its final status . When working on this study 1 was asking myself every day what will 
1 state when expressing my own op inion on the final sta tus for Kosovo. The question is one of the 
most complicated and risky problems in E urope, not only in the Westem Balkans . A lthough some 
form of independence seems to be the most su itab le solution, 1 have to admit that a clear and 
certain answer is st ili lacking. But it seems that any other so lution than independence, in an y 
form, would have to be implemented in Kosovo by force . Whatever the status would be, one side 
of the negotiations will be unhapp y with the solution. It occurs to me nevertheless, that some 
fomı of independence would be the best solution only because other forms are even worse and 
more risky. I have to emphasize that in such an environment any solution will be dangerous and 
the international community must be very careful when making a decision and implementing it 
afterwards . 
Any solution of the final question of Kosovo will ha ve multidimensional results. The position of 
Pristine in this regard is very clear: it wants to have nothing to do with Belgrade. It argues that 
the same attitude expressed Montenegro , inhabitants of which, although similar to the Serbs by 
religion and culture, vo ted for independence. Nevertheless, independence for Kosovo will raise a 
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number of questions in the region . Firstly, Vojvodina, which has also a status of the Serbian 
province with the Hungarian national minority, would have a great argument for its future 
separatist movements. Secondly, the same argument would appl y for the Srpska Republika in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would with the high probability cali for independence, although 
in !ast days of May this year Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the EU Special Representative in BiH, 
claimed that there was no legal bases for that. The Albanians in Macedonia, where they constitute 
about 25 percent of the entire population of the country, could also raise their question . Other 
second parties of the conflict, like Russia , would have precedence for the case of Chechnya. 
Elsewhere in the world, but probable with less impact, it would refer to China and the question of 
Tibet. 
Ali those difficulties in finding a common solution result from the history of Serbo-Albanian 
relation within the province. Both nations declare that it is their own land and they do not want to 
li ve w ithin the state of the enemy. Although Albanians and Serbs !ive in Kosovo for centuries, 
they have never lived together; rather they have been juxtaposed in living separate lives. This 
refl ects strong nationalism resulted from di fferences in religion and culture. The m yth of the 
Battl e of Kosovo Polj e is stili strong and independ ence for Kosovo would me coming back under 
the rules of 'the T urks' fo r the Kosovar Serbs. On the other hand, fo r the Albanians any linkage 
with Belgrad e would mean remaining under 'the Yugos lav' rul e associated with ethnic cleanings 
and vio lence . As fa r as the independence fo r Kosovo is considered, the alternati ve for the Serbs 
in order not to stay within one state with 'occupants' would be to leave to Serbia proper. But there 
are also non-Serb minorities, like Roma and Bosnians, who have no other place to go . U ncertain 
status of Kosovo for all of the nations, and especiall y for the Kosovar Serbs, for whom those !ast 
years ha ve been a period of often desperate surviva l effoı1s, leads to situation that people li ving 
th ere stili do not know if they will ha ve a chance fora noımal !i ve in the place where they were 
bom. 
In the conflict between both nations remaıns still its ethnic character. The conflict lasts for 
centuries and does not seem to be resolvable within years. Neveı1heless, an attempt to resolve it 
should search for solution by the root of the conflict. There is no common religion , no common 
culture, and no common history fo r A lbanians and Serbs and there probable will never be one . 
Gra ves in nıemory are harder to forget than those on the fıelds . N ev eı1heless, the spiritual leaders 
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may be those who contribute to building tnıst. This worked elsewhere in case of Germany and 
Poland, where the Poles say now that the present pope, a German by origins, is now also 'their' 
pope, in spite of the dark past in relations among both nations. However, it took at least two 
generations to gain reconciliation. 
In order to accelerate such a process in Kosovo, there is also need for a proper education for the 
young generation. With this respect I would venture on one suggestion. A good common 
university on the borderland, for both nations, apart from academic education, could provide an 
environment and education on know how to exist next to each other. Referring to the German-
Polish case, such a university on the borderland was created in Frankfurt/Oder in 1992, after the 
collapse of the communist system and now University of Yiadrina is becoming an intemational 
one, not onl y for Germans and Poles who study there hand in hand. In case of Kosovo, the city of 
Pec , near to which the borders of Albania, Kosovo , Montenegro and Serbia come together, would 
constitute an appropriate place for such an initiati ve. What the EU should do with this respect is 
financial support and auspices . A good education is also essential for involvement of Kosovo into 
the EU govemance system in the future. Support fo r Belgrade is of great importance for the same 
reason. Reso lving the problem of Kosovo by its roots and a clear perspective fo r both Serbia and 
Kosovo fo r the Membership in the EU constitute, in my opinion, the onl y way to establi sh peace 
and sec urity, not onl y within Kosovo itself, but also in the entire Western Balkans. This is what 
the intem ational community, and the EU in part icular, must never fo rget. 
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